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Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

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PAPERS ON POST-WAR PROBLEMS

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## STATESMANSHIP AND SPECIALIZED LEARNING

BY A. N. WHITEHEAD

*Harvard University*

Presented October 8, 1941

Received April 2, 1942

This series of addresses is devoted to the consideration of the ways in which learning derived from the systematic study of Arts and Sciences can profitably influence the reorganization of civilization in the future beyond this war. In so far as the world of learning today possesses a capital city, Boston with its various neighboring institutions approximates to the position that Paris occupied in the Middle Ages. Thus the importance of discussions initiated by these lectures cannot be doubted.

This first lecture is concerned with a preliminary topic—namely, the wide influence of social coordination on every feature of human life, and by contrast the specialized limitations of every type of learning. There is thus a gap between Statesmanship and Learning.

Our first impulse is to deny this gap. We point to the various departments of social sciences which exist in every university in the neighborhood of Boston. There are even departments for the training of government officials. This is true and these departments are doing a good job. But their purpose is very restricted. They *either* deal with very wide generalities concerning human existence, *or* they are confined to the specialties of some particular type of social coordination, for example, life in some South Sea Islands, or life amid the governmental activities at Washington, D. C. My point is that a survey of the World between the South Sea Islands and the District of Columbia in the United States, discloses a most perplexing number of types of social organization. The two phrases—namely, 'social coordination' and 'social organization'—are apt to be misleading, by reason of their omission of any reference to the *activity* which is an essential character of life. The term 'social cooperation' is nearer to the truth in expressing the problem of human life. We are apt to think of change in the past as the substitution of one static system in the place of another static system. A great deal of learned history supports this false perspective. When I look back upon my own young life during the remote period of the eighteen-seventies, it was largely dominated by the study of history. But curiously enough in my imagination History ended with the Battle of

Waterloo in the year 1815. Since then, the generations of my grandfather, and my father, and my own young school companions, were just living. This process of living was not History. It was mere daily activity. History in my imagination was concerned with the conflict of static organizations such as England, France, Spain.

The dispatches of statesmen unconsciously falsify contemporary life. They have to take the general set-up of emotional activity for granted and conceive of the adjustment of detailed consequences. But in altering the details the whole emotional structure is affected. For example, consider this country in the decade from 1860 to 1870. There was a desperate struggle issuing in large-scale changes. But the importance of these changes consisted in the deep transformation of emotional relations. The conclusion from these considerations is the importance of the Arts for the understanding of human life. This is a meeting of The American Academy of Arts and Sciences. During the last hundred years there has been a resolute attempt to turn Arts into Sciences. The founders of this Academy were right, there is a real distinction between the two. The Arts are concerned with the various types of emotional satisfaction, including the sense of correctness, and the Sciences with the various patterns which can be discerned and tested amid the activities of nature. In the Arts the pattern is a construction explanatory of the emotional satisfaction; in the Sciences the interplay of patterns is the essential consideration. The comprehension of existence requires the combination of Arts and Sciences. In concrete human action, there is always a Science lurking behind an Art and there is always an Art stimulating a Science. This is the reason why one Academy should include both Arts and Sciences.

In the analysis of the necessities of human existence the Sciences take precedence. On the other hand, when we are considering the purposes which should guide our action, the Arts are in the foreground, and Sciences in the background determine methods of procedure towards the goal defined by the Arts. Of course if our actions are predetermined in every detail, this whole discussion is a silly make-believe which we cannot avoid

because it is predetermined by the frivolity of the Universe. I rather suspect that this is the predominant doctrine in this audience. You must forgive me, because it is predetermined that I proceed on the contrary hypothesis.

The Arts take many forms—painting, sculpture, music, the analysis of the beauties of nature, cookery, and dancing, and architecture, and the decoration of the human body. The two Arts most relevant to these discussions of our Academy are aspects of recollection and anticipation, enlarged and stimulated by verbal expression—namely, History and Literature. The essence of History is description of the physical activities of the mankind in the past, with their function of eliciting various forms of emotional experience. The emotional experiences of mankind are essential to History. For example, it is not the mere fact that two heads were detached from two human bodies that is History—the History is the emotional convulsion of the European world produced by the execution of Charles I of England, and of Louis XVI of France. Of course it is the business of historians to make it certain that the heads in question were in fact detached from their bodies. Thus the function of History is the display of emotion derived from verified facts. Social Literature is very analogous to History, but it has a wider scope. It is concerned with facts which might have happened, or perhaps did happen, and with the emotions which might have been derived from those facts. But in another sense, such Literature has a narrower scope than History. Such Literature must in some sense be believable, whereas experiences of human beings in fact develop beyond all powers of conjecture. Thus Social Literature is conventional, while History exceeds all limitations of common sense.

In this short discussion of the function of the Arts in the interpretation of human behavior I have been using the term 'emotion' in a very extended sense, to include all activities of feeling and discrimination which lead to action, enjoyment, or purpose.

Science is concerned with the relatively stable patterns of activity which in fact dominate existence so far as we can observe it. Such stable patterns are essential factors for the determination of human behavior. But our scientific knowledge is only partial, and is restricted to average results. Science knows nothing of detailed eccentricities or of the gradual loss of stability as some patterns vanish and give place to others. Some type of eccentricity in the past is then becoming normal.

In this characterization of science I am merely agreeing with a statement by the late President Eliot of Harvard in one of his letters, written many years ago. I refer to him, because among other great qualities he was the incarnation of sound sense.

After this preface we can now turn to the function of this Academy in the present crisis of human existence.

Human beings are complex, various, delicate, excitable, and purposeful. They require a stable social organization in order to preserve them, and a large variety of opportunity to elicit their individual capacities. But these requisites are ideals. What in fact we can hope for is a sufficiently stabilized society to preserve life, with some very limited opportunities for the expression of individuality. This second requisite is the meaning of freedom.

These practical limitations of freedom make it necessary that those types of opportunity which a social system embodies should be relevant to the dominant desires of the populations concerned. It is not true that every society exhibits the same predominant desires among its members. Thus the first step in political wisdom is to recognize this astounding distinction between social groups.

Almost all effective thought belongs to one or another of two extremes: namely, either complete abstraction from any special circumstances or complete concentration upon one special group of occurrences. Induction is an effort to broaden the speciality of concentration. Experience has proved that induction is a very slippery customer. The greatest success in its use has been to suggest some broad abstraction such as the notion of Genera and Species, or the doctrine of Gravitation combined with Newton's Laws of Motion. Neither of these abstractions is quite true; but they have created modern science. For political thought induction from one society to another is most dangerous. It is useful in widening the range of imagination; but its naive application is fatal.

A minor incident mentioned in the newspapers a few weeks ago illustrates this point. The American Government, pursuing the doctrine of Freedom, of which it is so justly proud, is arranging for the emancipation of the Phillipine Islands from American control. This is a splendid example of a noble principle. But it turns out that one of the smaller islands is inhabited by people of different origin, different habits, and different beliefs, from the general population. These people of that Island have been completely satisfied with the

American supremacy: their ways of life are protected. But they view with horror subservience to an independent Philippine Government. It means destruction to them. This is a minute illustration of the whole problem of political reorganization.

Of course there is nothing insoluble in any one of these problems. But a simple-minded approach to practical politics is disastrous. In each particular case there are always special factors which must not be neglected.

And yet, when all this has been said, the large generalizations of science founded upon wide abstractions, only partially relevant to any particular case, provide the essential basis for all sociological re-construction. Within this century, science has provided new techniques, throughout its whole range from medicine to engineering, which are producing the greatest sudden revolution ever experienced in the habits of mankind. The world has shrunk in size, and has expanded in opportunity. Today the adventure of ideas is the discovery of opportunity.

Our discussion now passes to the special problem of political reconstruction after the war. This preliminary address is only concerned with the general outlook.

We shall be faced with a completely disrupted social system, in confusion physically, emotionally, and ideologically. This statement certainly applies to Europe, and to large portions of Asia and Africa. Also it must be remembered that sociological disruption is the most contagious disease known to mankind. Thus the first requisite is that order be imposed. There can be no civilization apart from a well-organized system of inter-related activities, within which the intimacies of family life can be developed.

Human life discloses many types of social order existing in the world, and—what is more perplexing—a great antagonism between adjacent groups in respect to differences of kinds of order, kinds of emotion, and of individual human beings produced by those various types. The love of humanity as such is mitigated by violent dislike of the next-door neighbor.

For this reason, no single world-wide solution of the social problem can be successfully adopted. Each special district must be studied with a view to the immediate solution applicable to it. There can be no one general system of social coordination which does not destroy the special capacities of smaller groups. The essence of the world-wide sociological problem is the study of the modes of

grouping mankind subject to some coordination of the various groups. Of course, this conclusion is a commonplace for all successful government. In this country, there are forty-eight States, and the District of Columbia, all supervised by the Central Government. Also in each State there are cities, counties, and townships, each with its freedom of action within limits.

Thus there must be a careful study of the possibilities of grouping, and of coordinating groups in different areas—for example in the Mahometan world of the Middle East, including Egypt; and in Central Europe stretching from the Baltic to the Aegean Seas with Russia and the Mahometan world on one side, and Germany and Italy on the other side. There is Western Europe, with its various groupings. Also there is the coordination of these groups.

But we have omitted the fact that owing to modern techniques the world in the future will be immeasurably more compact than in past history. India, and China, and the Oceanic Islands of the Eastern and Southern Oceans, and the two Americas which separate the ancient East from the ancient West, will be in essential, immediate connection with the small European and Mahometan Worlds, which first claimed attention. It is here that this Academy is of importance. Traditional statesmanship must be infused with the dramatic novelty which the immediate future presents. Among the people most responsible for this duty are the members of Academies of Arts and Sciences. They can compare the modes of action in the past with the novel possibilities of the future. It is their business to inform the populations and to guide the statesmen. Above all, it is their business to cooperate with each other, and not to exaggerate the petty views of the Universe which their own specialities present.

A stable order is necessary, but it is not enough. There must be satisfaction for the purposes which are inherent in human life. Undoubtedly the first essential requirement is the satisfaction of the necessities of bodily life—food, clothing, shelter. These economic factors are dominant up to the level of moderate enjoyment. They then almost suddenly become the mere background for those experiences which form the distinction between mankind and the animal world. It is the imaginative originality of mankind which produces ideals, good or bad. We live guided by a variety of impulses—towards loving relationship, towards friendship, towards other types of enjoyment such as games, art, ideals of mutual enterprise, and ideals



disclosing some sense of immortality. This intimate development of human experience enters into political theory as respect for each individual life. It demands a social structure supplying freedom and opportunity for the realization of objectives beyond the simple bodily cravings.

Of course any one group of human beings, however large, has a very finite set of appetitions, depending on past history and on the sort of prevalent ideals. In every social system there are exceptions, mostly foolish but some of them beyond price. It is of the essence of good government to provide some adequacy of satisfaction both for the large communal motives, and for all reasonable exceptions on which progress depends. It cannot be repeated too often, that the only security for progress is a sincere respect for each individual human being.

As we approach these problems the first words that occur to us are 'freedom' and 'democracy.' The preceding discussion has been devoted to elucidating the fact that 'freedom' apart from relevant 'opportunity' is a meaningless notion. Robinson Crusoe could do what he liked on his island: but, until the savages turned up, there was nothing for him to do. The history of mankind with its wars is the tale of groups of people seeking opportunity by the oppression of their neighbors. Sometimes these wars sink into minor disturbances and are conventionalized, as in the late middle ages and in the eighteenth century.

The enthusiasm for crusades—Mahometans attacking Christians or Christians attacking Mahometans—illustrates the poverty of life in the Middle Ages. Also slavery, or half-slavery, by eliminating the claims of a large portion of the population, preserved the limited store of opportunity for the fortunate minority. Today the notion of a master-race is being revived, and most of us are agreed that it means the moral degradation of mankind.

Within the last four centuries there have been three dramatic disclosures of new large-scale opportunities. I put aside the Italian Renaissance for it only concerned a fortunate minority. It was the last spurt of the Middle Ages. Thomas Aquinas would have enjoyed it.

The first disclosure was the discovery of a new world—namely the half-empty continent of America, as the immediate result of the new technique of oceanic voyaging. The real discovery was in fact the new art of navigation, and America was the first gift derived from it. The history of civilization opens a new chapter at this period, by

reason of this increase of opportunity. The problem of existence was not solved; but hope entered into human life as never before. The three countries most concerned—namely, Spain, the Netherlands, and England—for the period of about 150 years starting with the sixteenth century, exhibit a stage of excited hopefulness, while unfortunate Germany was torn to pieces by disputes inherited from the Medieval World. France was balanced between the two periods, and developed the brilliance of the old European civilization. The intensity of the French Revolution showed that novel opportunity had not penetrated throughout the nation.

The second enlargement of opportunity began about two and a half centuries after the first. It was the industrial revolution which gradually developed from the middle of the eighteenth century, with its two culminations in the invention of the steam engine, and the invention of the railway. Human life was transformed.

I am inclined to believe that its best effect was in opening the whole extent of North America to the European population. This was due to the steamboat and the railway. But nothing great in human history is due to a single cause; and we must also add the influence during the American Revolution of great statesmen guiding a peculiarly intelligent people.

At least, the new techniques transformed life throughout the world, more especially in Europe and America. In western Europe during the second quarter of the nineteenth century there was a period of optimism. The problem of human life seemed to have been solved, and the first International Exhibition in London, during the year 1851, celebrated this glorious triumph with the creation of the famous Crystal Palace.

Alas, something was missing. It may have been the want of intelligence among statesmen and industrial leaders. It may have been that the development of techniques was less fundamental than it seemed. Whatever the reason, the Crystal Palace, very symbolically, has been burnt down; and the nations are now struggling to avoid the ancient evil, which is the selfish mastery of the few over the many.

At the present time, we are in the first phase of the third enlargement of opportunity, perhaps the most important crisis in the history of civilization.

The intellectual development of mankind, with its self-conscious criticism, has a recent growth of some five or six thousand years. Its earlier stages seem to consist of traditional legend with the min-



imum of coordination. But about two thousand six hundred years ago, a widespread movement of critical judgment on the nature of things had established itself. The European races derive their special systems of thought from the brilliant races in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East, more especially from the Greeks. But in the course of ages the centre of activity has moved backwards and forwards through many races from Mesopotamia to the Straits of Gibraltar. It has also spread northward. There were analogous movements in China and India; and the three intellectual growths fed each other intermittently. But European systematic thought has shown the greatest energy both in self-criticism and by its contact with practical activity. Today it is refashioning the ways of thought and action in every civilized race of the World.

The result has been a gradual broadening of opportunity. But this growth has been intermittent, and wavering. Slavery became serfdom, and serfdom became free laborers on the edge of starvation. The status of the workers improved, although the slums of industrial cities disgraced industry. Indeed at the very moment when the Industrial Revolution was in its prime, Malthus managed to prove that the mass of mankind must always live on the verge of starvation. He was only answered by the nearest approach to an appeal to Divine Providence that men like John Stuart Mill dared to make. Every factor involved in human existence is too variable to justify these sweeping statistical deductions based on past experience.

As an historic fact, the gradual introduction of novel techniques has broadened the amplitude of opportunity for the mass of mankind, slowly and waveringly. Within the past five or six hundred years there have been certain crises in this slow advance, due to these novel techniques. These critical techniques are not the most interesting facts for abstract thinkers, but their immediate effect was overwhelming. For example, the evolution of trans-oceanic navigation, as distinct from coastal voyaging, is not very interesting for abstract learning. But it changed the history of mankind. Again, the thoughts of Galileo and Newton were of supreme interest, but the habits of mankind between the dates 1690 and 1750 were very slightly altered. The total effect was that fortunate people had a new theme of intellectual enjoyment. Indeed within this period the introduction of cheap spirits, such as gin, probably did more harm to English life than all the noble thoughts of the


Royal Society did good. But the growth of Science did arouse an alertness of intellect. The result was the Industrial Revolution in the hundred years between 1750 and 1850.

Today we are at the beginning of a new crisis of civilization, which gives promise of producing more fundamental change than any preceding advance. The growth of science in every department of thought seems to have reached a stage where the whole spread of knowledge discloses new possibilities for practice. This holds throughout the whole range of activities, from medicine to engineering, from mining to aerial flight, from the use of the microscope to the waves of energy from remote nebulae, from psychoanalysis to geology. The whole of human practical activity is in process of immediate transformation by novelties of organized knowledge. It is no longer a question of a new detail such as gunpowder, or printing, or the power of steam, or the novel machinery, or a new aspect of religious thought. Today, the whole extent of learned thought is transforming every activity of mankind. This is the largest epoch in human history. Historical knowledge is essential, but very dangerous. The old phrases are misleading. For example, in this country it is no longer sufficient to tell young people to 'Go West in a covered wagon.' In my own country (England), the old habits must be completely reformed. Again, we must insist, History is essential for the direction of action but its naïve application is very dangerous.

Still more dangerous are the simple-minded generalizations of specialized scientists beyond their own limits of special knowledge. The truth is that we must work together. Historians must study the new possibilities of action; and scientists must learn the old chequered history of human emotion passing into large-scale social activities.

There is one prophecy upon which I will venture. It is that throughout the vast land-areas of the Old World—Russia and China, for instance—the example of North America will be predominant. Perhaps also America has something to learn from Russia and China.

Also, forgive me when I conclude with a confession of personal political faith. I do not trust any extreme, abstract plan of universal social construction. Such plans are important for the stimulation of the imagination. But in practice every successful advance is a compromise. The general ideal is the wide diffusion of opportunity. The sort of opportunity relevant to each special case depends on special characteristics of the populations involved.



## DISCUSSION OF PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD'S PAPER

BY SAMUEL H. CROSS

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Presented November 12, 1941

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Professor Whitehead's talk laid down certain general principles which we may recall tonight with profit. You remember his statement that human beings require a stable social organization in order to preserve themselves, and a large variety of opportunity to elicit their individual capacities. "But," he continued, "these requisites are ideals. What in fact we can hope for is a sufficiently stabilized society to preserve life, with some very limited opportunities for the expression of personality." In this last the speaker discerned the meaning of freedom. He likewise pointed out that the practical limitations on freedom "make it necessary that the types of opportunity which a social system embodies should be relevant to the dominant desires of the populations concerned." He reminded us that after the war "no single world-wide solution of the social problem can be successfully adopted," and that "each special district must be studied with a view to the immediate solution applicable to it." Professor Whitehead also made the point that 'freedom' apart from relevant 'opportunity' is a meaningless notion.

Here, it seems to me, is a factor that was not provided for in the settlements after the last war. We established 'freedom,' or 'democracy' (if you like) in a variety of countries, including Germany itself, but without the economic opportunity to make that freedom worthwhile.

In Germany, for instance, the depreciation of democratic institutions (specifically, popular representation in the Reichstag) which set in with Bismarck and continued during the entire reign of William II turned men of energy and intelligence away from political activity into scholarship, finance, and industry, while the jingoistic propaganda of the nationalists tended to increase the authority of the crown, the bureaucracy, and the military caste. Hence when, in the fall of 1918, an attempt was made to transform Germany into a democracy, neither trained democratic statesmen nor a citizenry practised in independent thinking were available to make the system work. At best, an appreciable lapse of time was required before an understanding of the operation of democracy could take root. But this understanding could not be promoted unless the elements of the population likely to achieve it were encouraged and strengthened by the "opportunity" which Profes-

sor Whitehead mentioned. For as long as democracy limped because of economic disabilities wished upon it by the very foreign powers which had insisted upon its establishment, it had no vitality or popular appeal, and new weapons were thus placed in the hands of its opponents day by day until the catastrophe of 1933. In general terms, then, given a democratic victory in the future, it will not make much difference what sort of social and political system we establish anywhere unless they possess economic vitality and soundness.

Professor Whitehead referred to ideals. I mistrust ideals in the minds of people who regard the means of approaching them as equally absolute with the ideals themselves, and therefore resent any change in procedure. It is, for example, an American ideal not to engage in a foreign war, and a corollary to this ideal is the present reluctance to admit the thought of a new American expeditionary force on European or other foreign soil. Aid to the embattled democracies "short of war" was another ideal, and many American citizens consequently circulate with blinders on, refusing to admit that the ground has shifted. In this instance not only has the procedure become impractical, but the ideal itself is gradually proving untenable. The combination of a specious ideal with emotional involvement and motives of personal interest is thus a sure prescription for fallacious public opinion.

The problem of combining a stable social organization with a practical volume of individual opportunity is perennial, but the means of solving this problem inevitably vary. For any human problem is eternal, but human solutions, being at best mere expedients, are only temporary, since time shakes the material and psychological bases on which these solutions are set, even though the ideals behind the solutions remain fixed.

We therefore ought not, I think, to be so simple as to persuade ourselves that there will be any universal finality about the solutions reached after this war. Hence the slogans chosen to express its aims might well be a little less than categorical. It is perhaps permissible for a propaganda agency or a publicity man to talk glibly of "making the world safe for democracy" or fighting "a war to end war." The former Allies made the world

temporarily safe for British and American democracy, but by failing to provide the Germans with the opportunities to which Professor Whitehead referred or to realize that, as he reminded us, there can be "no single world-wide solution of the social problem," they managed ultimately to jeopardize practically every other previously existing or freshly-created democratic structure. The manifest result has been a decline of confidence in democracy and a tendency to disparage any sort of freedom as against security, even when combined with loss of free speech and self-government.

Professor Whitehead wisely pointed out that "history is essential for the direction of action," but that "its naïve application is very dangerous" because "the old phrases are misleading." This I take to mean that the wisdom of knowledge is not always coupled with origination or inventive imagination, so that it is a human propensity to yearn for the recreation of the *status quo ante*. It is, however, encouraging that the statesmen of the dispossessed nations who are now passionately discussing their various problems show little disposition to be fettered by concepts which the past has proved to be faulty. For the future of Central and Eastern Europe they are, in fact, eagerly debating various types of federation, and thus wisely working to satisfy Professor Whitehead's call for coordinated groups.

On the other hand, we may talk eagerly of some ultimate form of Central European or Danubian federation. But almost superhuman wisdom and patience will be required to reconcile national aspirations and jealousies which will be revived as soon as some prospect of liberation appears. Statesmen who regulated the destiny of these countries before the catastrophe may not necessarily be possessed of sufficient ingenuity to master new conditions, and those patriots who have withstood the rigors of enemy occupation may not enthusiastically accept the authority of those of their luckier fellow-citizens who managed to spend the war period in the precarious comfort of London and New York. The most zealous efforts of leaders in exile must be directed toward understanding and interpreting the sentiments of their compatriots under subjection in order to present the latter's needs and desires accurately when restoration becomes possible. Countries lately occupied will have to arrive at some degree of understanding with neighbors who not only were not occupied, but even, on grounds of national interest or cruel necessity, may have been forced to live in accord with the aggressors. The solution for Central Europe lies, not in

clinging to points of conflict, but in removing them by common understanding and concession.

However baffling these tasks are, they must be faced with determination and imagination by men ready to reject outworn tradition and to combine the lessons of the recent past with rational ideals of a better future in the creation of a peace of some duration. It is vital that no settlement after the present war should be vitiated either by the dire influence of remote historical events or by the perpetuation of more recent sources of embitterment. The crying need is for a spirit of healthy compromise, so that equal rights and opportunity may be established for Central Europe once the most dangerous points of contact between German and Slav are removed.

Such a rational spirit of compromise does not, by any means, preclude a decent respect for the problem presented by long standing German areas of colonization or regions of recent German infiltration in districts where the German element is surrounded by a majority of different culture and language. The Nazis themselves have not refrained from drastic measures of resettlement and transplantation to regulate such situations in their own interest, and they have quite openly not only declared, but also put into practice, their deliberate intention to wipe out the Slavic intelligentsia of Poland and Central Europe and to turn their Slavic subjects into a class of agricultural and industrial helots. In any peace settlement, whatever German action has been taken toward the realization of this dastardly project deserves the most ruthless liquidation, including removal of German minorities and the settlement elsewhere of such German immigrants as have been purposely introduced to form the nucleus of a new ruling class. This process similarly entails the removal of German population from areas historically productive of repeated international collisions, particularly the Baltic coast from Danzig to Memel and its hinterland. It does not mean, however, that these transplanted groups should be pushed back into an overcrowded Reich, but rather that, in compensation, appropriate colonial areas should be ceded to Germany which will absorb and employ its excess population, thus obviating the chances of its subsequent violent expansion at the expense of any neighboring European state.

But the lessons of the past go further still. The causes of the present war may be summed up in the fateful triad of revenge, strategy, and nationalism. If there is any outstanding conclusion to be drawn from the experience of the last twenty

years, it is that setting up a series of economically weak national states solely on the basis of romantic ideals, popular traditions, and strategic aims is no guarantee of peace. To bolster up their weak budgets or to favor local industry, such states erect tariff barriers which prevent the normal flow of commerce and exchange on which their very life depends. If their territories contain linguistic minorities, the latter are discriminated against in business and politics until they seek support from the nearest large state to which they are akin, and eventually provide that state with a natural pretext for intervention. In order to counterbalance their more powerful neighbors or checkmate some adjacent state with good diplomatic connections, these small states unite in ententes and alliances which become the pawns of international politics, and give the statesmen of these minor organisms a chance to assume positions of influence for which they may not be qualified by experience or vision. But with the progressive industrialization of the world and the need of reapportioning both essential raw materials and export markets, there are enough problems confronting the major nations in their dealings with one another without the additional risk of becoming embroiled over the petty aspirations, mistakes, and quarrels of these minor units.

In their own interest, therefore, such small states must inevitably resolve to combine into some form of federal organization. But such a federation cannot live and thrive unless it rests on the enthusiastic support of the masses, who need to be convinced that they are going to get a square deal from a government in which they have a direct stake through universal suffrage and graduated representation. We all talk glibly of democracy, and any average American knows well enough what he means by it: no vague abstraction but representative government, the secret ballot, unrestricted popular education, freedom of speech and worship, equality of opportunity in proportion to a man's capacity, absence of galling government restraints upon a man's private life, the state created for the service of its citizens, not as a cruel master of the individual's work and brain—in simple terms, precisely what one breezy Westerner called "the privilege of speaking one's mind and eating regularly."

Yet it is an open question whether the same definition would always stand when democracy is translated to Central Europe. Democracy does not mean government by an oligarchy of army officers, landowners, country squires, industrialists,

or intelligentsia, nor does it offer license for the impulsive activities of small political parties, each too doctrinaire to make concessions to its rivals or to do more than form a temporary part of some short-lived parliamentary majority. For the resulting inefficiency of the whole governmental machine is directly paid for by the declining prosperity of the masses, who then become the easy prey of discontent and of hostile propagandists from right or left. The essence of democracy lies in its permanent obligation and capacity to correct and reform itself. No great institution becomes static unless it has begun to decay, and if a democratic nation does not remedy its own defects, hostile ideologies will use them as effective weapons against it. A federation of this nature, then, must not only be economically sound, but it must also feed on a healthy popular loyalty.

Finally, however bitter may be the resentment felt by the dispossessed nations against the Germans and especially against the present masters of the Reich, it may be set down as axiomatic that, even though certain transplantations of German minority groups appear imperative, a generally punitive peace settlement should be ruled out as opposed to the common interest of the modern world. Every devotee of democracy resents German pretensions to superiority over the Slavs and, conversely, no peace can be enduring which reduces eighty million civilized people to a state of political vassalage. It is likewise impossible to reverse the current of history entirely by partitioning a homogeneous nation now accustomed to unity. Nor can peace be restored if such a nation is deprived of adequate trade outlets or raw material supplies. If a virile nation is barred from colonial expansion, it will expand at the expense of its immediate neighbors: hence certain colonial readjustments are vital. To speak of annihilating such a nation is futile and barbarous. It was Masaryk himself who said, "We often confuse hatred for another nation with love for our own." As soon therefore as the Nazi system reveals its essential weaknesses under the pressure of ultimate reverse or defeat, the younger German generation, now so devoted to it, must immediately be given concrete proof that democratic ideology is actually superior to the false philosophy for which they have been making so many useless sacrifices. At this moment we may not foresee exactly what form of government is best for the German nation. But whatever German government is set up after a Nazi debacle must not be paralyzed by galling restrictions and a sense of inferiority.

These are some general and practical reflections inspired by Professor Whitehead's paper. As scholars we must think on these things and make

our conclusions known, lest the adjustment of critical problems is left by default in the hands of those louder-mouthed and less informed.



## DISCUSSION OF PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD'S PAPER

BY HANS Kelsen

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Any discussion of post-war problems is possible only under the presupposition that the United Nations will win the war and that they will succeed in destroying national socialistic and fascistic régimes, as well as military dictatorships, wherever they appear in Europe or Asia. Should this not be possible, then there is no hope for this better world which we have in mind when we speak of post-war problems.

In our discussion, however, we will not proceed from this but from the other possibility, the realization of which we fervently hope for: the victory of the United Nations. The new world order to be established shall be a community of States within which war will be excluded; a community the prosperity of which will be guaranteed by a permanent peace, "a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want." (Point 6 of the Atlantic charter.)

Such an order is possible only under two fundamental conditions. First: there must be, as far as possible, political and economic homogeneity among the states forming the community. There is little reason to expect communist or state capitalistic states and states with a liberal economic system to exist side by side, even in a fairly loose international organization, as to expect democratic and autocratic states to combine in an enduring union. Second: a satisfactory regulation of the territorial relations of the states forming the community is imperative. This kind of regulation is possible only if it is conducted as extensively and honestly as possible according to the principles of the right of self-determination of the peoples. Where minorities are unavoidable, they are to be organized as entities with constitutional rights. The treaty establishing the international community will grant them the status of personality in international law, so that they will have the right to call upon an international Court in case of the violation of the provisions for minorities.

As far as the first condition is concerned, a great difficulty arose when the Soviet Union became a full Ally of Great Britain and the United States of America in the war against Germany and Italy. We must reckon with the necessity of admitting the Soviet Union into the new international com-

munity, and we cannot expect that the Soviet Union, especially after a victory in which she had a great share, will abandon her communistic and authoritarian régime. However, this difficulty is perhaps not so unsurmountable as it seems at the present time. On the one hand, the economic system of the Western Powers has a clear tendency towards state capitalism, and on the other hand, a victory of the democratic states will strongly influence the political system of the Soviet Union, whose written constitution already has taken on a democratic character. It will only be necessary to conform the political practice in the Soviet Union to the wording of its constitution.

Much more serious, however, are the difficulties which confront the fulfillment of the second condition, namely: the principle of self-determination of the peoples, especially "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live" (Point 2 of the Atlantic Charter). It is almost impossible to found the peace on this principle. Of course, the peace treaty will immediately restore Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Greece as independent states in full accordance with the free will of the peoples concerned. These peoples will undoubtedly reestablish their democratic constitutions, or enact such where before the war more or less fascistic elements prevailed, as for instance in Poland and Greece. But the major part of Europe offers no guarantee that its peoples will voluntarily and spontaneously return to democracy and peaceful cooperation with the other peoples. Let us constantly keep in mind that there exist in Europe eighty million Germans, more than forty million Italians, twenty-six million Spaniards, fourteen million Rumanians, thirteen and one half million Hungarians, who have lived for years under totalitarian régimes. Especially the youth of these countries, educated by national socialistic and fascistic teachers, does not know the ideal of democracy and international peace. Let us not forget that Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia and Finland are now fascist states, or are under the influence of Germany and Italy, and that, last but not least, a great part of the population has, rightly or wrongly, lost its faith in democracy. As far as Japan is concerned, we all know that it is and has been, for many years, under a military dictatorship and that its younger

generation is completely alienated from democratic ideas.

Immediately after victory, it will not be possible to organize this better world for which we are hoping. A transitional period will be necessary, characterized by the following facts: complete disarmament of all states now under national socialistic or fascistic régimes or military dictatorship; political and military control of these territories exercised by a body of representatives of the United Nations, above all in order to win the population of these countries for democracy and international cooperation, and to educate their youth for these ideals. No illusion is more dangerous than to assume that these Germans and Italians, these Spaniards, French and Rumanians, these Japanese, (more than two hundred million people) are democrats and pacifists, and that only their dictatorial masters prevent them from having the same political organization as this country or Great Britain.

How long will this transitorial period last, and which is to be the political form of the Union which finally may be established? The first question cannot be answered now. Everything depends upon circumstances which cannot be foreseen today. As far as the second question is concerned, two different plans are suggested: one is to reestablish the League of Nations, the other to create a completely new international organization. The difference between these two plans is, however, not so great as it might appear at first sight. For, should the League of Nations be revived, it could never be the old, it must be an entirely reformed League of Nations. And if a new international organization is to be established, the lessons which can be drawn from the breakdown of the old League will be indispensable for building up the new community.

The decisive question as to the constitution of the new League refers to the degree of centralization which shall and can be realized in the law-creating and law-applying function of the new community. It is the question whether the international community shall or can have the character of a Federal State or only of a confederation of States. There is no doubt that the aims of the intended organization would be achieved in the best and most effective way if this community would be organized as a Federal State; that means the establishment of a World Parliament and a World Administration which is, of course, incompatible with the sovereignty of the member states of the Union. On the basis of our experiences with attempts of creating international organiza-

tions, the idea of a World Federal State must be considered—this is my personal opinion—a utopian scheme. Even if such a Federal World State should be desirable, it is, seen from a realistic point of view, quite unlikely that within a reasonable time great powers like the United States of America or the British Empire will unite with dwarf states like Denmark, Norway or Switzerland, that republics and hereditary monarchies will from one day to the next give up their sovereignty, will found a Federal State, will submit their own governments to a World Government in which all the members participate. It is more than likely that this aim, if one accepts it as such, can be reached only in various stages. From the political point of view, the only serious question is, *what is the next step on this road to be taken with a view to success?* Obviously, it can at first only be an international Union of States, a confederation of States, not a Federal State that one should set up. It can be only a confederation of States, and not a Federal State, if the new community of states shall be created by an international treaty concluded by free and democratic governments and not by unilateral coercion exercised by a victorious power. Such a Federation of States is not incompatible with the existence, within its framework, of closer and more centralized unions of single member states. Such a closer union may be established especially by the United States of America, Great Britain and some others of the United Nations, and must be established if these states accept the responsibility of a political control of the vanquished countries.

As far as the constitution of the wider League is concerned, the breakdown of the League of Nations has furnished us a valuable experience. One of the most important, if not decisive, causes of its failure was a fatal fault of its construction, the fact that the authors of the Covenant placed at the center of this international organization not the Permanent Court of International Justice, but a kind of international administration, the Council of the League of Nations. The Covenant placed the Council, not the Permanent Court, at the center of its international organization, because it conferred upon the League not only the task of maintaining peace within the community, by settling disputes and by restricting the armament of the member states, but also the duty of protecting them against external aggression. This protection of member states against external aggression is possible only if the government of the League disposes of an armed force, if the League has its own



army, navy and air force. Such a centralization of the executive power means the establishment of a Federal State. Because it was impossible to organize the League of Nations as a Federal State, the League failed completely in its duty to protect the member states against external aggression. The experiences of the League of Nations show that it is necessary to make a clear distinction between the maintenance of internal peace within the League, and protection of the members against external aggression, and that it is hardly possible to fulfill the second task by the specific means at the disposal of a universal international organization embracing many different states. As long as it is impossible to constitute this union of states as a Federal State, it seems to be more correct to limit the task to the maintenance of internal peace, and to leave protection against external aggression to political alliances between the member states. To maintain peace within the international community, its constitution should try to establish the strongest possible guarantee within the compass of international law: the obligation of the member states to submit all their disputes without exception to the *compulsory jurisdiction of an international court* and to execute in full good faith any decision of the court. That means that the members of the League agree to *abandon the use of force* in their mutual relations (Point 8 of the Atlantic Charter), except against a member which in disregard of its obligations refuses to execute a decision of the court or resorts to war or reprisals against another member, without being authorized by a decision of the court.

If the treaty constituting the international community does not establish a central executive power, an army, navy, and air force of the League independent from the armed forces of the member states—a central armed force at the disposal of a central government—the decisions of the international court can be executed against a member state only by the other members of the community, if necessary by the use of their armed forces under the direction of an administrative organ, such as the Council of the League of Nations. The Covenant of the League may determine the size and the organization of the armed force which each member state has to keep in readiness to execute the collective sanction according to the orders of the Council. The Council may be authorized by the Covenant to appoint an organ whose function should be to control the military obligations of the member states and, if a military sanction is


to be executed, to appoint a commander-in-chief of the League. But the Council of the new League should be an auxiliary organ of the Court. The fact that its task will chiefly be to execute the decisions of a court, will facilitate considerably the composition and particularly the procedure of this administrative organ, especially as its decisions must be adopted according to the majority-vote principle.

A new League of Nations whose central organ was to be an international court with compulsory jurisdiction would constitute an extraordinary progress in the field of international organization. It would be the technical realization of an idea which the Kellogg Pact first tried to put into operation: the elimination of war as an instrument of self-help. The Kellogg Pact could not succeed because it pursued its end with technically insufficient means. The League here proposed would be an intermediate stage between the old League of Nations and a future World Federal State with a world government; an intermediate stage which is inevitable in the natural evolution of international law. The next step, not the last one. After we have succeeded in establishing an international community uniting the most important states of the world under a covenant instituting compulsory jurisdiction, and after this political system has worked successfully for some time, we can try to make a further step, we can hope to succeed in organizing a centralized executive power, a world police, and later perhaps a world administration under a world parliament.

As far as the economic purposes of the new League are concerned, its constitution must contain certain provisions which guarantee to the members of the League the right "of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity" (Point 4 of the Atlantic Charter), and secure for all members "improved labor standards, economic adjustments and social security" (Point 5 of the Atlantic Charter).

But I would like to lay stress upon the fact that, contrary to a wide-spread opinion, it is not the economic element which determines the political one, it is the political element which determines the economic one. If the history of the last decades has taught us anything, it is the primacy of politics over economics.

It is a political task to win the war; it is a very difficult task, but even more difficult will it be to organize the peace.



## II

### SOUTH AMERICA AND THE WAR

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South of the Rio Grande, there are twenty Latin American republics. They contain an area larger than that of Canada and the United States. They have one hundred and twenty-seven million people, only a few million less than the United States. However, the productive capacity of the people of Latin America is not as high as that of the people of the United States and Canada, chiefly because of the greater mechanization of the latter two countries. Nevertheless, the people of Latin America can play and are playing a very significant part in the war efforts of the United Nations. Though these countries have many manufacturing regions and industries, they are primarily producers of raw industrial materials and foodstuffs which are in great demand principally since the loss of areas in southeastern Asia.

The impact of the present war on Latin America has been terrific, to say the least. Of course, you all realize that the influence of the war on Latin American nations has not been as great as it is on the occupied countries of Europe and Asia—countries that have completely lost their economic status and their political and personal freedoms as well. All the people of Latin America feel the impact of the war. These countries have lost a considerable share of former markets for their products. The people realize as the war progresses that victory for the Axis would also mean for them the loss of political and personal freedoms.

In nearly every aspect the influence of the present war on Latin America has been different from that of the first World War. During the first World War the shipping situation did not become as critical as it is at the present time. There was little German organized activity in Latin America, whereas today Axis propaganda activities have been well organized and have penetrated most sections of Latin America. In the last war Latin American countries lost a relatively small proportion of their European and Asiatic markets for industrial raw materials and foodstuffs. Today these markets are completely lost to those countries, because of the effectiveness of the British and American blockades. Despite the effectiveness of the Axis submarine campaign, the United Nations still control all the shipping lanes to Latin America.

*The Shipping Situation:*—For cooperation in the war effort Latin American nations need shipping and need it badly. All the large merchant fleets of France, Italy, Norway, The Netherlands, and the small merchant fleets of several other continental European countries no longer serve Latin America. Neither does the large Japanese merchant fleet. Much of the British merchant fleet has been withdrawn. Before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor, most of the United States and Canadian passenger vessels, serving Latin American countries, were taken over by the Navy and Army. However, there is still a large freight tonnage serving this area. Latin America has sufficient tonnage to carry only a small proportion of the commodities it can supply. However, authorities state, that despite the submarine campaign, the shipping situation will improve. Now that the people of Latin America realize that civilians in the United States must get along without many commodities, they do not feel so badly about their inability to secure consumer goods formerly obtained by means of foreign shipping.

*Axis Activities:*—Less than a year ago a rather important government official in Washington stated that Axis activities in South America were not well organized and would not amount to anything. Recent events have proved that this official was uninformed of the situation and that he was entirely wrong in his statement.

Conservative estimates place the number of Germans in Latin America at 3 million; the number of Italians is several times that of the Germans. The Japanese in Latin America total about 330,000. Germans are concentrated chiefly in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile; the Italians chiefly in Brazil and Argentina; and the Japanese chiefly in Brazil and Peru. However, Axis officials and propaganda agents are present in small numbers in all areas.

Far more than the German and the Japanese, the Italian colonist has been assimilated in the countries where they have settled. Most of these Italians do not want to have anything to do with the Fascist program in Italy and the greater program of the Axis powers. Italian propaganda agents and officials have not been able to organize the Italian population. This situation,

however, is not true with the Germans and the Japanese.

During the first World War the large numbers of Germans in Brazil, Argentina and Chile did not become disturbing elements for the governments of those countries. Though some of these countries took up arms against Germany, the settlers gave no serious trouble. However, the situation of these Germans today is not comparable to that in the last war. The Nazi officials and agents have organized all Germans. According to the theory of the Nazis, all pure Germans and also all Germans of mixed stock are still German, no matter how many years they have lived in Latin America and no matter what intermarriages have taken place with non-Germans. The German organization is centered in the embassies. Without exception, German embassies have a larger personnel than other embassies. In some centers, German personnel is greater than that of all other embassies combined. In Buenos Aires, the German embassy has 150 persons as against 30 for the British. That in Santiago numbers 40 persons as against 17 in the American embassy. In all Latin American countries the organized Nazi party has been outlawed. However, often in the same building with the embassy, are the offices of German Beneficent and Cultural Societies, which have taken the place of the old Nazi party organization. In addition there are many hunting clubs, skiing clubs, church clubs, etc. Through the embassies and these organizations, all Germans in Latin America are enlisted in Nazi propaganda activities. In organizing the Germans, officials have used persuasion and force. Persuasion has been eloquent; force has been effective. All of these people are under the direct control of the German Foreign Office. Their names are card indexed and classified in Berlin.

Funds for Nazi activities have come from several sources. Members of societies are assessed for 10 per cent or more of their income. German firms and banks pay their toll. Large sums of money have come directly from Germany. Ostensibly, funds are collected for charitable purposes, for Winterhilfe and for relief of poor Germans in Latin America. However, no accounting has been given. Expenditures of these embassies are out of all proportion to German connections and business transacted. In 1940-41 the German embassy in Buenos Aires spent 5,980,000 pesos, in contrast to 1,830,000 pesos spent by the British, during the same period. Investments and business of the

British in Argentina are more than 100 times those of the Germans.

With characteristic thoroughness, the Nazis have utilized all means of spreading propaganda. They have used the postal service, press, movies, radio, German schools, churches, and airlines; they also have put pressure on national leaders and minority parties in order to overthrow governments not in favor of the Axis program. Sufficient time is not available for a detailed analysis of the various propaganda campaigns. I should like to discuss briefly two types of activities:

*German Mail Campaign:*—A well organized German mail campaign floods the various countries with books, pamphlets, letters, and postcards. Cards and pamphlets are widely distributed, not only to the Germans, but also to a large mailing list of influential sympathetic citizens. This past summer, I saw in Lima and several other cities, a children's Spanish edition of the Life of Hitler. Early last August, I was in Buenos Aires, when the Argentine officials impounded the sixty-seven pieces of supposed personal baggage of Ambassador Von Thurmman, which had made its way to Argentina by way of Japan. When searched, it was found that the baggage was not personal, but that it consisted almost entirely of propaganda literature, done up in small packages with detailed instructions as to where to place the different packages, so as to be most effective. In the same baggage, was found at least one high-powered radio sending set. Obviously, Von Thurmman did not get this baggage. The newspapers in Buenos Aires reported, that on the afternoon the police impounded the baggage, Von Thurmman was seen in his backyard burning huge piles of waste paper. Until recently, the special air mail edition of the Frankfurter Zeitung has been sent by air mail to an unknown number of first citizens throughout several South American countries. In July 1940, postal authorities in the Misiones territory of northern Argentina averred that 95 per cent, by weight, of all the mail handled in the territory was German propaganda.

*German Pressure on National Leaders:*—The German industrialist, merchant, and banker, as well as the personnel of the embassies, associate with the national leaders in the different countries. Nazi pressure on politicians ranges all the way from cajolery to bribery. Decorations to army officers, free trips to Germany for generals and politicians, academic awards for scientists, scholarships to German universities, are gifts that have been presented with such grace that the word

"bribery" would appear rude. They win support by citing German successes, reiterating the certain victory of Nazi armies, and by emphasizing the fact, that those countries had nearly half of their foreign trade with continental Europe before the war, and will need the cooperation of German-dominated Europe after the war.

Nazi agents stir up trouble between various factions in the governments. In several instances, Nazi activities have been significant in the attempted *putschs* to overthrow governments in order to set up new governments in complete sympathy with the aims of the Axis powers. In May 1940, investigators in Uruguay discovered a German document—a detailed military plan to seize Uruguay, to eliminate troublesome citizens, and to make the nation an agricultural colony of the Reich. The congressional investigation, which followed, proved that the Nazi Party in Uruguay had branches and agents all over the country and collected toll from the members by persuasion and force. The Nazi organization had supplies of rifles, machine guns, ammunition, and a well-organized bicycle corps. Like an earthquake, the disclosures shook the Baldomire Government of Uruguay to its very foundation, but the government weathered the shock, broke up the Nazi Party and arrested, tried, and deported eight of the accused men.

Disturbed by rumors of German activity in the territory of Misiones, the Argentine Government in July 1940 ordered an investigation. Nazi headquarters were raided—50 machine guns, 3,500 rifles, and much ammunition were discovered and sent to the national arsenal in Buenos Aires. These revelations stirred up public demand for action. Since then, numerous government investigations have uncovered subversive Nazi activities in several other provinces of Argentina.

Plans for the *putsch* to overthrow the Bolivian Government last July failed completely, as did also the attempted *putsch* in Paraguay less than a couple of months ago.

Japanese in Latin America cooperated with the Germans in making propaganda and in preparing for the attack on the United States. Only recently, the Congressional Committee, investigating aviation conditions in South America, discovered that six Messerschmidt planes were recently flown into Colombia by Japanese pilots. The planes and pilots later disappeared on German plantations in Colombia. The same Committee learned that the Japanese had secretly stored 8,000 tons of dynamite at Medellin, Colombia, within easy flying distance from the Panama Canal. They also dis-

covered that Japanese and Nazi agents had established several secret air bases in Colombia, chiefly in connection with German plantations. This past summer I saw two of these air fields in remote sections of southern Colombia. During the past two weeks the Brazilian Government has uncovered a well organized plan of Japanese officials and Army officers to overthrow the Brazilian government upon receiving orders from Tokyo. This *putsch* like several of those of the Germans has been nipped in the bud.

*Accomplishments to Date:*—In the past two years much has been done to accomplish hemisphere solidarity and to obtain complete cooperation by Latin American nations in the war efforts of the United Nations. Some of these accomplishments have been achieved so quietly that many people do not appreciate what has happened and do not see the full significance of them.

*Axis Airlines in Latin America:*—The Germans were the first to introduce commercial airline service between parts of South America. On September 30, 1939 German and affiliated companies in South America had 25,700 miles of airlines. The network connected all South American republics. While many of these airlines were commercial in character, others were extended to remote places of the continent for strategic purposes only. Many airports were laid out on a more generous scale than is required for commercial use only. The lines have been operated without regard to profit. In March 1940 the Germans secured a license to extend a line from eastern Brazil to the far northern boundary on the French Guiana border. There are few inhabitants in that section and little or no trade. The northern route offered opportunities for checking steamship movements in the Atlantic. The Brazilian Government soon cancelled the charter for this line. Between September 30, 1939 and September 30, 1941, the mileage of Axis lines in South America decreased from 25,700 to 14,480. On the other hand the lines owned and operated by United States interests increased in the same period from 18,460 to 33,520. In the autumn of 1941 not a single Axis line existed in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and there was only one connection with Chile. Some of the lines in Brazil had been taken over by the Brazilian Government. Late in December all the German and Italian lines were grounded by the Brazilian Government. Services on these lines have been duplicated by government lines or subsidiaries of the Pan-American Airways. Even the Italian trans-oceanic operations have



been replaced by a new Pan-American Airways service across the South Atlantic to Lisbon. No Axis plane flies within, or connects with, any portion of the Western Hemisphere.

*Blacklisting of Firms:*—Last year the United States Government discovered a considerable leak in essential war materials to the Axis in Europe through firms in Latin America. For example, Germany obtained platinum from Colombia as late as early 1941. Likewise, as recent as late in 1941, Japan obtained block mica, a very strategic material, from Brazil and shipped it by air to her Axis partners. Consequently, the United States has placed more than 4494 Axis firms in Latin America on a blacklist. Almost without exception, Latin American countries have cooperated with the United States in enforcing the blacklist, despite the fact, that they are not legally required to recognize our regulations covering individuals and firms acting in the interests of Germany, Italy, and Japan.

*Freezing of Funds:*—Early in the war, in order to curb activities of the Axis agents, United States began to freeze the funds of occupied countries. Last summer the United States froze all Japanese funds in this country. Following the lead of the United States, most Latin American countries have frozen all funds of occupied nations and Axis powers. Taken together, the freezing of funds and the blacklisting of firms has put the finishing touches on all German, Italian, and Japanese trade activities in the Americas as long as the war lasts.

*Trade in Raw Materials:*—Even more significant accomplishments have been achieved in the field of trade and sources of raw materials. The British and American blockades have completely cut off markets which formerly took about half of the total exports of Latin America and regions which supplies essential manufactured goods. The loss to Latin American nations in exports alone totals more than one half billion dollars. Of course, the loss has not been equally felt throughout Latin America. The Caribbean nations have suffered least because the United States has had a dominant position in their trade—both exports and imports. Argentina and Uruguay have suffered most because their surplus agricultural products compete with our own. At no time has the United States accounted for more than 15 per cent of the total trade of these two countries. However, increased purchases by the United States have relieved considerably the financial distress in many sections, even to some extent in Argentina and Uruguay. In 1940, we purchased from Latin

America one hundred fifty million dollars more than in 1938. In 1941, we purchased more than five hundred million dollars over the 1938 level. In other words, for Latin America as a whole our purchases have largely offset the loss of European and Asiatic markets.

Our increased purchases include many critical and strategic commodities. The Metals Reserve Corporation, a government organization in Washington, has contracted to take all of the surplus copper, tin, vanadium, tungsten, bauxite, antimony, manganese, industrial diamonds, mica and other essential minerals. In 1941, we purchased the entire wool clip and surplus accumulated stocks of wool in Argentina and Uruguay. The Latin American governments have cooperated with the United States by agreeing to deny all these essential war materials to the Axis powers and by pledging virtually their entire output to the war needs of the United Nations.

The possibilities of Latin America in supplying essential war materials have only begun. Of a list of about 40 materials essential to the production of military equipment, Latin American nations supply considerable quantities of 28. Among these are many of the critical and strategic minerals. The output of these in Latin America can and is being increased rapidly. Shipping facilities will be made available to move these products to the factories of the United Nations. Latin America can also supply large quantities of certain strategic fibers and other materials, such as wool, tanning materials, coconut shell char, and hides and skins. On the other hand, we cannot look to Latin America to supply us with large quantities of certain products formerly almost entirely purchased in southeastern Asia. Such things include jute, kapok, Manila hemp, quinine, silk, opium, and rubber. Much has been written recently about the possibility of obtaining some of these materials from Latin America. There is no production of jute, Manila hemp, silk, and opium in Latin America. However, for some uses other fibers of Latin America may be substituted. Sufficient coconut trees are growing in Latin America to supply us with coconut shell char and also with a considerable fraction of our requirements for coconut oil. From the millions of wild kapok and cinchona trees growing in the tropical rain forests of Latin America, we can by the organization of a gathering industry obtain kapok fiber and quinine in considerable quantities. Despite rather optimistic estimates by several officials, the forests and plantations of Latin America cannot supply us

with sufficient rubber to make up for the loss of the supplies from Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. There are only two rubber plantations in Latin America. They can produce only a few thousand tons of rubber. With time and much money for the organization of a gathering industry from the wild trees, we probably can obtain in 1943 about 60,000 tons of rubber from the wild rubber trees. This would be equivalent to less than 10 per cent of our requirements. While many areas are suitable for the production of rubber on plantations, it would take at least six years, much capital, and careful organization to bring new large rubber plantations into production.

Even though we may obtain all that Latin America can produce of the above strategic and critical materials, we cannot get from those countries sufficient quantities for the manufacture of military equipment and at the same time supply normal civilian consumption. However, by largely eliminating civilian consumption of many products, the United Nations can go a long way toward obtaining from Latin America sufficient materials for the manufacture of military equipment. Whether we like it or not civilians can and will for the duration get along without many commodities formerly consumed in large quantities. This is true not only of the people of the United States but also those of the Latin American countries. The realization by Latin Americans that the people of the United States will have to deny themselves of certain pleasures and luxuries has improved considerably inter-American relationships.

*Capital.*—To obtain larger quantities of the above materials from Latin America will require much capital from the United States. It is fairly well known that for a long time Latin American countries have not had the capital with which to develop their resources. Even before the war, billions of foreign capital had entered Latin America. While those nations have tapped various sources of revenue, most of them depend upon customs receipts for from one-third to two-thirds of their total government revenue. Both imports and exports are taxed. With the loss of foreign markets and with their inability to obtain imports, these sources of revenue have been cut drastically. Consequently, in the present crisis the need for foreign capital in Latin America is greater than ever. Since the outbreak of the war, Germany, Italy, and all the occupied countries of Europe have been completely cut off as creditor nations. In order to prosecute the war, the United Kingdom has had to call in reserves of both private and government

capital and credits in foreign countries. Consequently, the United States is the only large source of capital for Latin American enterprise and loans. In September 1940, Congress allocated one half billion dollars to the Inter-American Bank for the development of Latin American resources and the orderly marketing of the products of those countries. Under these regulations, sizable loans have been made; one hundred ten million dollars to Argentina; three and one half million dollars to Paraguay and various sums between these two extremes to other areas. Such capital is being used especially first, to develop facilities which will supply increasing quantities of strategic and critical materials; second, to improve transportation facilities; and third, to develop manufacturing establishments that can produce some of the wares formerly supplied by the continent of Europe.

Though the recent loans and private investments and those that will be made may total hundreds of millions of dollars, they will represent a tiny fraction of the total cost of our war effort. For the material and other aids Latin America can give to our war effort, this capital is well placed even though some of the principal may never return to the United States.

*Military Aid.*—As a layman, I speak with less authority on questions of military matters than on economic. Nevertheless, a layman with an economic and geographic training is in an excellent position to analyze certain phases of military defense in relation to problems of hemisphere solidarity and the war effort. In the present world, no amount of economic and political planning can achieve hemisphere solidarity without the material equipment for exerting force—without adequate naval, army, and air power and suitable bases for their operations.

Latin American countries have not, until recently, seriously considered the possibility of military attack from Europe. The Monroe Doctrine and the existence of the British and United States fleets have seemed to them adequate guarantee against that possibility. The German conquest of most of Europe, however, with the resulting threat to the British fleet, the fact that the bulk of our fleet has been stationed in the Pacific, and the activities of German agents in certain South American countries have changed the picture, particularly for Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. These east coast countries face Africa, and could be threatened from there, should western Africa fall into the hands of the Axis partners. Northeastern Brazil, is only 1600 miles from western Africa.

This is only two-thirds of the distance from northeastern Brazil to Puerto Rico, formerly our nearest naval base.

It is fairly well known that Latin American army and naval facilities are very limited. Altogether Latin American nations have only 111 fighting ships, mostly average, with a total tonnage of approximately 263,000. There is no comparison between the size and equipment of their naval ships and ours. The twelve Caribbean republics together have a naval tonnage of less than 19,000, less than that of one modern cruiser. Yet the Caribbean area with the Panama Canal and Caribbean shipping lanes is a most strategic area. Eighty-seven per cent of Latin America's naval tonnage is in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil—forty-two per cent in Argentina alone. These southern republics have 5 battleships, 7 cruisers, 25 destroyers—with 9 more being built in Brazil—16 submarines, and many smaller vessels. Furthermore, the armies of Latin America are small and poorly equipped.

With these facts as a basis one might assume that Latin American nations could from a military point of view do little, if anything, to assist the United Nations. As a matter of fact this assumption is far from correct. After the attack on Pearl Harbor and the conference of ministers at Rio in January, nearly half of the Latin American countries declared war on the Axis powers; all except Argentina and Chile broke off diplomatic relations. Breaking off diplomatic relations and a declaration of war means putting an end to all Axis propaganda and the arrest and internment of all Axis agents. Most Latin American governments are doing a rather thorough job in this respect. It means that the ports and naval bases of those countries are open to our merchant and naval vessels and closed to those of the Axis powers. It

makes available the small naval fleets for policing their own coastal waters. The Caribbean nations have gone one step farther. They have permitted the United States to establish many airplane and other bases within their borders for patrol purposes for the protection of the Panama Canal and the Caribbean shipping lanes from marauding submarines. Though the Latin American nations may not be able to give us great aid directly with their armies and navies, by an open break with the Axis, thus cutting off all intercourse with them, they may contribute greatly to the actual conduct of the war. With the present position of Argentina and Chile, the American nations have not achieved complete hemisphere solidarity and complete cooperation in the war effort. However, pressure is being and will be applied to those two countries until they fall in line with the other nations, thus presenting a solid front against the Axis.

*Conclusion:*—Most of the Latin American nations realize that economic and political security for them depends upon victory for the United Nations. Because of the success of the Axis powers and the full realization of what the Axis program and Japanese Greater East Asia mean for conquered peoples, the Latin Americans are willingly working to aid the United Nations. They realize fully that the job of supplying military equipment and fighting battles on many fronts falls heavily upon a few of the United Nations, especially the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the U. S. S. R. By supplying critical raw materials and by eliminating Axis contacts in those countries, the Latin Americans are giving valuable aid for the cause of democracy. Despite minor differences of opinion, the people of the United States should give Latin Americans full credit for what they can and are doing in the war.



### III

## "VS-300 HELICOPTER"

By IGOR I. SIKORSKY

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Many of us still remember the first decade of flying when planes were frequently operated from small fields, or even race tracks. It was then expected that progress in the art would permit taking off and landing from still much smaller places. Actually, the development went in the opposite direction and further progress made it necessary to use much larger and better airports than those which were adequate for the early airplanes. This being the case, flying proved to be drifting away from homes, residences and places of occupation rather than moving towards them. The possibility of an aircraft capable of duplicating the performance of a hummingbird that could land in any spot on the earth where it could spread its wings, appeared more difficult than was thought in the early years, even, perhaps, impossible. It became evident, however, that while the fixed-wing airplane would never permit obtaining such performance, yet a good solution of the problem was entirely possible on the basis of a different principle of flying.

The object of this article is to give a brief description of such a mechanical hummingbird, the United Aircraft VS-300 Helicopter, which is the result of a work that was started in 1909, was at times discontinued, then was resumed and finally resulted in the creation of the present aircraft. This helicopter was completed in the Fall of 1939; it made many hundreds of small hops, underwent a large number of developmental changes and improvements; it demonstrated its capability for direct take-off and landing with no forward speed, as well as excellent flight and control characteristics. Finally, on May 6th, 1941, the VS-300 established the world record for endurance for helicopters by remaining in the air for 1 hour, 32 minutes, 26.1 seconds exceeding thereby the previous world record held by Germany. During this entire flight, it hovered above an area less than half an acre.

The success of the VS-300 leaves no doubt that the direct lift machine is here. It might be interesting, therefore, to review briefly the type of service it can render.

The helicopter in general must not be expected to replace or duplicate the service of the vast

majority of military or commercial airplanes. The helicopter's place in air travel is to solve a transportation problem that is not yet met by any other means. While it will probably have a limited operating speed of between 100 and 150 miles per hour, yet due to its complete independence from airports, it will prove to be by far the fastest and often the best method of travel for the comparatively short distances that the average individual is usually called upon to go.

For instance, it will cover the average 100-mile journey much more rapidly and more conveniently than any other vehicle of transportation, including its fixed-wing brothers. It will do it more rapidly because the average journey is not from airport to airport, but from home or office to some practical destination. In other words, a 100-mile trip in a 200-mile airplane would require, besides the 30 minutes of flying time, an average of from 30 to 40 minutes of ground transportation at either end, plus the often unexpected delays of making automobile connections, getting under way, facing traffic congestions, etc. This being the case, the 200-mile-an-hour airplane becomes really valuable only for much longer distances, while for trips of 100 miles or less, the helicopter will prove to be much faster, as well as much more reliable and convenient.

Darkness or poor visibility are an incomparably lesser danger or inconvenience to the helicopter than they are to the privately owned airplane. If the driver of a helicopter finds himself in a questionable predicament, he may slow down safely to 30, 15 or 5 miles per hour, just as he would in his car. He may then proceed close to the ground, flying around obstructions or trees and, if necessary, he may land in any place the size of a 50-foot clearing. The spot may be a vegetable garden, a ploughed or muddy field, or a rocky knoll, etc., and in all such places the helicopter would land safely and comfortably.

The number of services that an aircraft with such characteristics could render can hardly be over-estimated. In this tumultuous world, we must unhappily give thought to certain grim aspects. In war, the helicopter will be excellent for communication, for sudden short range bombing

attacks, for convoy purposes both on land and on water, for observation, reconnaissance and scouting, for gun-fire control, for liaison behind the lines, for removing trapped or wounded troops, or for depositing troops behind the enemy lines, etc. In government services it would be excellent for airmail over short distances, for carrying passengers and airmail between airports and the post-office or the heart of the city, for crop-dusting, for rescuing persons marooned by storm or flood, or delivering food and medical supplies to them, for coastal patrol and for life-saving under greatest possible variety of conditions.

The facility with which the helicopter may render service under the most difficult circumstances is augmented by its ability to hover directly over one spot for indefinite periods of time. Thus, even if a landing is prevented by heavy woods, surf or other conditions, a rope ladder or basket can easily be lowered to deliver or raise materials, as well as men.

The above-mentioned performances are no longer a question of theoretical speculation because the possibilities of most of them have already been

demonstrated with the present light, low-powered, purely experimental VS-300 helicopter. This aircraft has many times been taken off and landed on very small spaces, in backyards, often with some obstruction such as a big tree some 10 feet directly in front of the machine. Repeatedly a man standing on the ground has fastened a load to the end of a rope dangling from the helicopter while the ship hovered motionless above him. It was then lifted into the air and unerringly deposited on a given spot or lowered into the arms of a waiting man. Another demonstration of its ability is that it has often been flown up to a standing man while a suitcase has been placed on board, without the man taking so much as one step, and without the aircraft ever touching the ground.

From these facts, it may be concluded that a successful helicopter is now in existence and that it opens a vast and untouched field in flying. It is now possible to look forward, earnestly and hopefully, to the rapid and final improvements that will bring this type of transportation to the world.

## IV

### TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RELATIONS

By CARLETON S. COON

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#### *Introduction:*

Never before, in human history, has a disturbance arisen as great as that of the present war—a disturbance affecting, directly or indirectly, almost every single human being on the face of the planet. One of the automatic reactions to this disturbance has been the effort of political leaders, popular writers, and scientists to determine what is wrong with our system of world relations, that could permit such a disturbance to arise, and what can be done to make sure that it will not rise again, once the battle is won. I assume that we shall, as we must, win it. That is the premise upon which this discussion is based. Some of the most far-seeing men of our time realize that we must solve this problem now, and not wait until the war is over, since its solution is as necessary for the shape of the war as it is for the shape of the peace to come.

The principal difficulty, which has brought this state of affairs to pass, seems to be a lack of planning in human relations during the fabulous twenties and the twilight of the thirties. Planning of this kind was more necessary than it had been before, because, although few of us may have realized it, one era of history had ended, and another had begun. People failed to realize how necessary it was to provide a basis for equilibrium for the lives of the different peoples of the earth, one which would permit an integration of the mutual relations of mankind as a whole.

Before this time, technological advances could be made without upsetting the balance of the world, because the presence of empty land, or the conquest of technologically inferior peoples, allowed expansion without planning. Once the empty lands had been filled, once the last of the primitives had been killed or packed off on reservations, the pioneering period was at an end, and it was necessary for us to make our adjustments within a contracting, rather than an expanding, universe. In the past we always made our expansions at the expense of simpler peoples, but we can do this no longer since there are no more such peoples to conquer or empty spaces to fill. Any expansion now is a case of dog eat dog.

The only way in which adjustments can now be made is to abandon the age-old, automatic process of trial and error, and to plan them on the basis of the physiological needs of the individual human animal, and a recognition that these needs are the same, whether the animal in question is a modern American, an African Negro, or an Asiatic.

The equilibrium which we must attain is not to be defined in terms of economics alone, but rather in terms of the way in which people get along with one another. One of our greatest mistakes has been to leave the process of adjustment in the hands of the economists and engineers, who, however expert they may be in their own fields, have only a lay knowledge of human relations. They are therefore unable to see the human consequences of the changes that they have themselves instituted. They should not, however, be blamed for this, since they have done their own job remarkably well; the error lies in their belief that because they could build automobiles or float international loans, they were experts in human relations as well.

The results of this fallacy speak for themselves. Every plan, whether for a new world order or for a Treaty of Versailles or for a League of Nations, has to be run by human beings. Its operation involves the emotions of human beings, and their peculiar ways of behaving. No plan works automatically. The usual excuse of the people who tackle these problems in terms of economic or political logic is that they regard human nature, as it manifests itself in human relations, as an extraneous factor over which there is no control, and which spoils the beautiful symmetries of their cloud castles. They say: "It was all politics," or "it was ruined by graft," not realizing that politics and graft are predictable phenomena of human relations.

The only test of a plan is to see whether or not it works. The excuses made by planners of world orders that did not work, and by unsuccessful international politicians, are as fallacious and self-incriminating as it would be if an engineer, when his bridge collapsed, were to say: "It was a beautifully designed structure, but one can never tell

about the strength of metals." Builders of world orders must find out about the properties of human beings in their relations to one another, and this can only be done if we start at the beginning and study the physiological basis of human behavior.

### *The Physiology of Human Relations:*

Human relations, as students are beginning to realize, form an essential part of the activity of the human organism, and cannot be separated from this activity any more than the "mind" can be separated from the body. Each human organism, like other animals, maintains what is called an internal equilibrium, essentially similar to the equilibrium of inorganic substances long recognized by the physicists and chemists. This equilibrium is maintained, as long as the organism is alive, through a series of bodily processes, changes in the rates of which we call *emotions*. Emotions may be defined as disturbances in the equilibrium of the bodily processes which are produced by changes in the external environment. They are, in other words, the reactions which occur when these bodily processes try to adjust to new conditions.

Cannon, Bard and others have shown how what is called emotion is made up of the combined effect of changes in heart activity and respiration rates, and in the velocity of the chemical secretion of blood sugar, adrenalin, mechoyl, and other substances. These adjustments are regulated by the autonomic nervous system, which is consequently responsible for maintaining equilibrium when sudden changes take place in the environment, which disturbs the equilibrium, rage and fear responses are set in operation.

These emotional patterns are basically reflex in character. Though we learn to discriminate between stimuli, that is, though we become conditioned by experience, some reaction always occurs in response to changes in stimuli. If these changes are sudden, that is, if we become afraid or angry, cortical control is decreased, and our capacity for adjustment, for fine discrimination, and for carrying out our regular routines, is lost.

In any institution, that is, a family, political group, industrial organization, etc., changes in stimuli are constantly activating the autonomic nervous system and its associated organs of the individuals concerned. These stimuli, affecting each individual, come primarily from other people, and our relationships with people are consequently the principal source of our emotional experiences. These relationships take for the most part the form of routines, to which we become conditioned,

and when these routines are interrupted we suffer emotional disturbances. That is why it is so difficult to get people to change their habits in an emergency which has not already affected them personally.

If the contacts which we have with other people and to which we are conditioned occur with a regular frequency, or if the changes which take place in them are quantitatively small enough so that rapid adjustments can be made, the autonomic nervous system maintains the organism in a state of equilibrium. If sudden changes, to which we cannot readily adjust, occur constantly, if equilibrium is not rapidly restored, then the autonomic balance is upset and marked compensatory changes in activity take place. Then the system of relations is upset; people are frightened and angry; they are unable to adjust to others and to accomplish tasks which require cortical control. In other words, they lose their heads. And when they lose their heads they do things that will serve to upset the equilibrium of the people with whom they are in contact, and these people may in turn disturb others, until the equilibrium of large institutions may be disturbed.

The problem of equilibrium in a state is essentially the same as that of peace in the family or morale in an industry. In each case the problem is to organize the technical routines of operation, be they family routines, or political, or technological, in such a way that the equilibrium of individuals is maintained, or, if once disturbed, is rapidly restored before the violent compensatory reaction of fear and rage take place: in simpler words, a state of peace, equilibrium, morale, or whatever you wish to call it is obtained when the individuals within groups can adjust rapidly to changes without becoming afraid or angry or both.

Since the technical requirements of the work or duties of any institution, be it a family, a state, an industrial plant, or whatever, require certain daily, weekly, and other routines, and since the individuals who perform these routines have to learn complex motor habits, the aim of any planning board, or management, whether it be for a button factory or a new world order, which wants to succeed, must be to see that these routine habits can be carried out in times of crisis as well as under normal conditions. This can be done, but only if the individuals of whom the family, the factory, or the world order is composed are not constantly disturbed and emotionally upset. That is why free men work better than slaves, and why a state founded upon justice, equality, and a voice for all

is, in the long run, a more lasting and progressive state than one founded on tyranny.

### *Technology and Human Relations:*

It is readily apparent, therefore, that the requirements of the human organism for equilibrium in interaction, which may be called "human nature," are more or less constant, and that in all populations they will vary individually within more or less the same limits. In every population there will be some who are energetic and others who are not; some with the capacity of leadership and others who lack it. Furthermore, as far as we can tell at present, the inherent capacity of the individual for making cortical linkages, which seems to be the basic variable in what we refer to as intelligence, also varies in each population within given limits, and differences in so-called intellectual performance between groups of people may be attributed not to genetic differences but to differences of conditioning.

In view, therefore, of the essential equality of mankind, one is led to ask what is the reason for differences in the complexity of human relations in different societies, why are some people "primitive" and others "civilized," and what bearing has this problem on our problem of establishing a world equilibrium? The answers to these questions are that variations in the complexity of human relations depend on differences in the technological processes by which people exploit their several environments, since the bulk of human interaction, i. e. human relations, is carried out on a technological framework. For that reason the understanding of technology is essential to the problem of planning a world equilibrium.

A few examples should suffice to show how technology, in combination with environment, controls human relations. Let us first consider the technique of water transport. Two French Canadian trappers are paddling downstream in the early summer, from their trapping grounds to the trading post, with a heavy load of furs. One man paddles bow, the other stern; their actions must be synchronized if they are to reach their destination. Thus the technique of canoe paddling determines their mutual relations during the working day in summer; but it determines a number of other things as well. It limits the number of men who can work together at this enterprise; it limits the amount of fur which they can bring down, and the amount of food and other supplies which they can take back in the fall. In combination with their other techniques it limits their relationships with

other people, making it impossible for them to take their wives and children along, enforcing isolation on the two of them during the long winter, limiting their interaction with the trading company to a brief period, and their participation in state and church to the same time. Men who live by this and the accompanying techniques cannot build up complex sets of human relations.

Another example may be drawn from the field of manufacturing. In the mountains of Morocco, in the tribe of Taghzuth, the land is too poor to support a large population. Nevertheless there is a large supply of tan bark in the forests. The men of this tribe are mostly craftsmen, and many of them are engaged in tanning hides and manufacturing leather bags to be sold outside. In some instances a man and his sons run a leather-working establishment, and the pursuit of this technique enforces the frequency of events within this segment of a family. The need of buying hides and selling the finished product establishes other relationships with specific individuals. In times when the demand for leather bags is great, the master craftsman will hire apprentices from outside the family, which will mean new relationships, and he may delegate to one of his sons or apprentices the task of selling the bags to jobbers, so that his commercial relationships are thus extended and canalized.

If the average American will consider the techniques which he himself practices, be they metallurgy, medicine, pedagogy, or whatever, he can readily see how his own human relations are determined by them, and how this extends to his relations outside his immediate technical pursuit, as for example to his family. He gets up in the morning, and after interacting briefly over the breakfast table with his wife and children, runs for the train. During the day his time is taken up with relations in other institutions, in which he has been conditioned to a daily routine; if that routine is seriously disturbed he will have had a "bad" day. He meets and must adjust to dozens of persons in different institutions during the day. This wide range is facilitated by his use of the telephone, the automobile, the subway, etc. The more complex technology of his civilization renders his daily routine of interaction correspondingly more complex than that of the fur trapper or of the Taghzuthi leather worker.

### *Equilibrium in Technological Processes:*

In any technical process in which a number of people work together, be it in government, the



church, industry, or the family, there are three potential sources of disturbance, as follows. The first is *the inefficient definition and allocation of work*, in which people do not know exactly what they are supposed to do, or what is the most efficient way of doing it. Such technical inefficiencies prevent individuals from making satisfactory relations to one another in terms of the work process. They are unable to develop regular work routines and are constantly upset.

The second is *the maladjustment of personalities in terms of the work process*, where individuals with personalities which they cannot adjust to one another are forced to work together by the requirements of the job. For example, the two fur-trappers who are paddling their canoe must be similar in activity rates, so that they can paddle together synchronously. Otherwise they would become upset, and angry at each other, and their partnership would dissolve. The only way to avoid difficulties of this kind is to get the right man for each job, and this can best be done by an objective study of the physiological properties of the individuals concerned, in terms of the specific job. A military leader, excellent at organization in peace time, might be useless on the field of battle. A McClellan will not make a MacArthur.

The third is *faulty relations between members of different organizations*, as when the heads of the Army and Navy will not speak to each other and thus permit a military disaster; when the members of neighboring countries cannot understand each other and hence develop friction whenever they meet; when the superintendents of factories leave everything to their overseers and have no contact whatever with their men, and many other such examples.

Disturbances of all three kinds can be avoided or eliminated if we understand not only the technological processes concerned, but also the biological properties of the people who practice the techniques. A technique exists only as some human being or group of human beings practice it. You cannot talk of a technique as apart from human relations, as some archaeologists discuss potsherds and bronze axes as if they were living organisms that procreated and evolved without the aid of man; the archaeologist who works in these terms will never make a true reconstruction of history, and the planner, political, industrial, or otherwise, who plans in terms of treaties, bank-notes, or machines without thinking of the men whose relations are determined by these devices will never plan a working society.

### *Modern Technological Systems:*

As we have already stated in the introduction to this symposium, the technological systems of what we may call the colonial or pioneering period in our world history are in the process of replacement. These technological systems were characterized by methods of communication vastly inferior to our own, so that no world equilibrium had yet developed. The world of mankind was broken up into a series of isolated or nearly isolated systems. For example, the United States obtained rubber and rattan from the Malay Peninsula, but the natives of these two countries seldom saw each other and knew little about each other. The same was true of the relations between Argentine beef-growers and the Englishmen who ate the beef, etc.

Within the major systems, by which term we categorize the great, imperialistic powers, the adjustment of individuals was unstable, and equilibrium was attained only through external aggression. The mill-workers of Lancashire could be kept at their looms only as long as British soldiers and merchants carved out new markets for their cotton fabrics in Africa and Asia; and later on Japanese industry was dependent upon Japanese shipping and trade.

Sooner or later, as the frontiers disappeared, these major systems were bound to come into conflict with one another, and since each of them could continue to maintain its former type of equilibrium only by further expansion, the expansion of one would necessitate destruction of others. This process of expansion and conflict has been accelerated by the rapid improvement, during the last two decades, of our techniques of travel and communication, in combination with an increasing efficiency in manufacturing processes, particularly in the field of mass production. We are no longer concerned with partly isolated systems whose relations are carried on at a low frequency in a few channels only. After the last war England, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United States had the choice between a mutual adjustment or an explosion. Attempts at adjustment failed because of their unwillingness to consider the human requirements of everyone concerned.

Inequality in material possessions is characteristic of intermediate stages of technological development. The simplest food gatherers, like the Australian aborigines, are all equal—each man has his flint knife and his handful of spears, each woman her digging stick and her stone for grinding seeds; they could not own more things than these because they could not carry them about


with them in their search for food. With sedentary life and improved techniques, the relatively complex relationships which arise between individuals in societies produce the basis for inequality. We are still in an intermediate stage in this respect, but we have made the technological advances which will inevitably bring us out of it, to a third stage in which the distribution of goods can once more be approximately equal. In other words, we have now attained the position in which we can calculate the requirements of our populations and we can look forward to their fulfillment.

These requirements are not concerned with bodily comfort alone, but also with the techniques by which people can adjust to one another most successfully. The widespread use of the automobile in the United States will serve as an illustration. Efficient transportation enables us to avoid a rigid system of routines, conditioned by life in a small circle of relationships; it enables us to interact in a wider and more varied circle. We can choose the friends of our liking from many communities, instead of having to get along with our immediate neighbors, whether they are compatible with us or not. We can move out of the cities and adopt routines more satisfactory to those who cannot adjust easily to crowded urban life. The possibility of cheap airplanes or helicopters in the near future means that this process may be extended even further. It may not be too rash a generalization to make that nations whose peoples are relatively mobile, from the Arabs and Mongols to the modern Americans, have a greater

flexibility of adjustment and hence a greater stability, than purely sedentary peasant and urban communities.

It is not only in the field of transportation that modern technological science has provided us with new developments, even since our entry into the war. Great advances have also been made in mineral extraction, metallurgy, and other basic techniques, so that the technological basis for human relations has been potentially extended to an enormous degree; this means that it is now possible, or that it will be when the war is won, to maintain constant relations between people in all parts of the earth; that our problem of timing in world events can be solved, because the technical means are at hand. Once people can be made to realize the significance of these changes and reconditioned from their habitual patterns of behavior, technology has provided and will increasingly provide for that ultimate stage in human democracy, when the peoples of the earth will share alike in its products, and hence differences in their relations to each other will depend upon differences not in race or place of birth or wealth, but in individual personality and attainment.

If, therefore, we plan wisely, and if we strike in time, our conquest of technology should, even in our own lifetimes, bring to the world what we now fight for—universal freedom—that equality of opportunity for all the peoples of the world which we in this country have been promised and have of all peoples most nearly attained.





## THE NATURE OF WORLD EQUILIBRIUM

BY CONRAD M. ARENSBERG

*Introduction:*

Now that we have seen how technology, acting upon the human organism, conditions the form and extent of human relations, our next task is to determine what structural form these relations take, in other words, how individuals adjust their personalities to each other in institutions.

The importance of technical activities, is not confined to the direct conditioning of the relations of specific individuals. Technology has even broader implications; it controls the ways in which groups of individuals live and work together. The requirements for interaction which it imposes necessitate the mutual adjustment of groups of individuals in such a way that they attain a state of equilibrium.

We have already seen how the physiological properties of the individual himself bring about such a state; but in order for any kind of stability to be maintained, all the individuals with whom he interacts must also achieve a similar state and this can only occur if the relations of all individuals together form a system in equilibrium.

In the performance of any technical activity, where more than a single individual is involved, an adjustment must be developed between the individuals concerned. In the case of the French-Canadian trappers mentioned in the last paper, an adjustment between the two individuals concerned had to occur or else the pair would have been unable to work together and would have had to split up. In more complex technical activities, however, where a number of people have to interact in order to accomplish successfully their technical end, one of the individuals must act so as to secure some degree of coordination between the several persons and the tasks to be performed, if the activity is not to fail completely.

For example, in a Paiute antelope hunt observed in Nevada almost a hundred years ago, the Indians had built a corral of logs at the end of a valley, and had placed clumps of sagebrush in two diverging lines from the mouth of the corral for several miles up the valley. At the appointed time several hundred Indians were stationed at fixed points; some between the clumps and others up on the hills. When the signal was given the men on the hills started beating and yelling and driving all the animals in their neighborhood down the

slope; as the animals tried to dart between the clumps of sage-brush, other Indians would jump up and frighten them back, until finally all or almost all of the antelopes, jackrabbits, and other animals had reached the gate of the corral, where the men converged and drove them in.

This antelope hunt required the cooperation of many people, under the direction of a leader, who organized the hunt in the first place, bringing people together from their distant camps, telling each of them where his station was to be and what he should do, and giving the signal to begin.

In our own society we can take almost any example to illustrate this. One of the easiest to illustrate is that of a ship; even on the smallest tramp the technical requirements of operation make it necessary for many men to perform different skilled tasks at the same time, or in ordered sequence. When the ship is about to leave the dock many things happen at once. The donkey men draw in the loading booms; the stevedores march ashore over the gang plank, and members of the deck crew batten the hatches. Down below the chief engineer is watching his dials while the black gang is feeding the furnace, and the oilers are at their stations along the main shaft. Up in the chart room the mate is plotting a course, while the captain talks to the pilot, who has just come aboard. The time has come to shove off. The captain pulls the lanyard for the ship's whistle, and the men below take their positions on the deck. The captain signals to the bos'un, who blows his whistle. Members of the crew draw in the gangplank, and the men standing on the pier cast off the bow lines. Then the donkeymen reel these lines in quickly. A bell rings; the captain has signalled to the engineer—the propellor turns and the ship moves forward and outward. Now the stern lines are taut, and the propellor churns the water; the ship is thus turned so that its axis lies at an angle to the dock. Another signal, and the ship moves astern; the stern lines slacken and are cast off. Now the ship moves forward and steams away from the dock and out of the harbor.

In this familiar scene of a ship leaving port we have an example of a sequence of events involving a number of men who perform separate, specialized tasks in such a way and with such accurate timing that a complex maneuver is executed. In this

instance and in that of the antelope hunt, the successful accomplishment of these separate duties in unison can only occur if some one individual's actions serve as the signal for others to perform their parts of the operation. Events such as these occur continually in daily life, and their repetition conditions individuals to the performance of specific technical activities under the direction of specific leaders. These recurrent patterns of ordered action make up the structure of society. These routines are physiological in nature and provide the individual with the basis for his equilibrium. When these routines go wrong; as when the antelope break through the line of beaters or the ship fouls the pier, rapid changes occur in the activity rates of the individuals concerned, and the resultant emotional disturbances can readily be seen.

*The Division of Labor and the Complexity of Institutions:*

In all human societies there is some kind of a division of labor which the specialization of the men on shipboard will illustrate. It derives not merely from the fact that many techniques in fact require several individuals to perform them, but also that individuals have different capacities to perform different types of work. The simplest example of this differentiation, which is found in all societies regardless of their technological level, is the division of labor on the basis of age and sex. Thus men hunt, fish, trade, and go on the warpath, while women take care of the children and do their housework; children play, adults work, and senile individuals reminisce with each other while basking in the sun.

But within this general division, individuals tend to specialize; one man spends most of his time trading, and another at making weapons for the rest of the group; one woman concentrates on making pots, while another may weave blankets for which she is specially noted. This part-time specialization, due to the special aptitudes of the individual, derives largely from the essential physiological properties of human beings, in terms of the technical differentiation which these simple tasks necessitate.

As people develop more and more complex techniques, a further division of labor takes place. In weaving, for example, instead of the whole process being performed by one person, from shearing the wool to the final process of dyeing, several persons may specialize, one to shear, one to spin, one to weave and one to dye the finished material.

Since a specialist is more skillful than a jack-of-all-trades and can, with superior techniques, produce more goods per day or per hour, people who live on such a level have more material possessions than those who lack this kind of division of labor.

As the techniques become increasingly complex, an increase in the division of labor is not the only result; another is the need for more and more supervision. In an automobile factory there is a whole staff of men whose task it is to plan operations and to organize the workmen, as well as to direct them; leadership becomes increasingly elaborate and itself specialized.

In any group of men working together at a task of any complexity, therefore, there must be organization if the task is to be successfully done. This organization must be habitual—that is, the man who is leader one day must also lead the next, and the order of action from director to foremen to workmen, and from department to department, must be habitual and the personnel must be suited by their personalities to their several roles, and conditioned to them as well.

*The Organization of Peasant and Urban Communities in the Pre-war World:*

Now that we have seen how the complexity of institutions of which societies are composed depends upon the interactional requirements of the technology available to the group, we can begin to estimate what effects the systems existing before the rise of the modern technological age will have on a world order. Even today new and old technical systems face each other throughout the world, and the attainment of a world equilibrium is dependent upon the way in which these adjustments are made.

We can leave out the extremely simple, primitive societies, such as those of the Australian Aborigines or Eskimo, which numerically speaking are of little importance, and concentrate our attention upon these groups of people whose principal technological pursuits are agriculture and manufacturing.

Aside from these primitives, then, the pre-war world could be roughly divided between communities which we can label by the term peasant, and those which participated fully in the advanced technology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A good example of such a peasant culture is to be found among the farmers and fishermen of Western Ireland. Here the most important institution is the family, and the agricultural techniques by which people make their liv-

ings are all carried on within the membership of this limited circle. This agricultural system, based upon the family, was tributary to the urban system of the British Empire, since the grain and beef cattle which the Irish peasants produced as their cash crops flowed mostly to the markets of industrial England.

This Irish peasant culture, with its emphasis on the practice of agricultural techniques within the family, has changed little since pre-Christian times. The Kings of Tara, the Anglo-Norman overlords, the British territorial governors, and the Irish Free State government itself, mark successive changes in the political organization of the country, and the language of the people has even changed, without this family system being visibly altered. The reason for this conservatism has been that whatever the shifts of authority at the top of the political organization, whatever the changes in the lives of the rulers, the peasants themselves have continued to till their fields with the same kinds of tools and in the same ways and have thus undergone no visible change in basic technology. Since the relations of people depend on their roles in practicing techniques, the typical Irish peasant system has survived unaltered.

What is true of the Western Irish is true in general of peasant communities everywhere; in Russia the liberation of the serfs and the assassination of the Czar made little difference in human relations in the countryside, because the farmers were still using the same plows and the same rakes and fattening their pigs in the same way. Changes in the structure of Russian peasant society did not come with communism, but with the introduction of the tractor, just as what little change has taken place in modern Irish peasant communities in recent times is associated with the electric butter churn and other such devices.

To these peasant communities may be contrasted the urban civilization of the period in question. Each European country and many countries in other continents, had a number of cities in which people lived with enormously greater specialization and division of labor, and in which they practiced much more complex techniques than their country brethren. In urban centers people worked in factories and other large enterprises and exchanged their manufactured products for the foodstuffs and other raw materials of the countryside.

Nevertheless the relationships between urban and rural communities were limited to a few channels. The peasants bought their goods at the cross-roads store or from peddlars, but they

seldom saw or talked with the people who made these objects; they remained in their rural environment and maintained their rural system of relationships in almost complete isolation. This is exactly the same situation which obtained between the nations which were largely urban, such as Great Britain and the Netherlands, and the colonial regions from which they drew their raw materials, such as the Malay Peninsula and the Dutch East Indies. The lives of the natives in these latter regions were relatively unaffected by their relations with the industrial nations; although they bought ready-made cloth for their clothing and rode bicycles, the basic techniques by which they raised their food and got along with their fellow men remained the same.

The reason why urban and peasant communities throughout the world remained relatively isolated during this period, can be found in the field of transportation. England could ship goods around the world in her merchant steamers, but they put into relatively few ports, and the distribution system on land was, except for the railroads, little better than that which existed in Roman times. The railroads themselves were costly to build and operate and could reach directly only a small proportion of the peasant and colonial populations.

Another branch of technology which was partly responsible for this situation is the field of communication. Without telephone or radio, relying entirely upon the rails and the telegraph, events could occur weeks before administrators in the capitals of world empire knew about them, and what is more important, peasant populations could remain largely isolated from any administrative action.

As I pointed out in the case of Ireland, the peasant societies throughout the world achieved a state of equilibrium which remained relatively constant over a long period of time. Within the cities, as a function of changes in technology, there was a continual struggle for dominance among the various economic institutions, as each group tried to achieve an equilibrium for its members in the face of competing institutions. This attempt of technological systems to stabilize their relations with customers and sources of supply was carried over into a contest for control of the political system. Yet whichever group temporarily seized control, the life of the peasants went on with little change.

The very stability of these peasant systems and their isolation from the urban centers and administrative officers of the government made the oc-

casual efforts of the latter to introduce changes of little avail. In fact, changes in the relations of peasants and overlords brought about automatic reactions within the peasant community, and thence reactions in turn produced a restoration of equilibrium. Thus when the overlord overtaxed the peasants, the latter became angry and banded together to resist the tax gatherers. The overlord could destroy the community but he could not change its rate of production or its level of equilibrium.

*Modern Technology and the Equilibrium of Institutions:*

The technology of the present period is rapidly destroying the contrast between rural and urban systems of relations, and that which has existed between imperialist nations and their colonial dependents. The reason for this is not hard to discover. In this country, which pioneered in the modern technology, country people and city people use the same technical devices for many of their operations; they both use electric washing machines, electric flat-irons, etc. They both ride in automobiles, and furthermore they can see the same moving pictures, listen to the same radio programs, and read the same magazines. With improved transportation people who work in the city can now live in the country, and people who work in the country can make frequent trips to the city. Many factories are now built in the country, and draw on rural populations for their labor.

Thus the influence of present-day technology is to bring country and city people into a single major system of relations which must achieve an equilibrium. We have no longer a peasant backlog, maintaining an even subsistence level in bad times and good, always able to eat but little more; today the farmer of the dust bowl is just as subject to profound fluctuations as the factory worker or the shipper. All of us in this country are part of a technological system based upon mass production.

In outlining the general framework for a world equilibrium, therefore, we must reckon with the

fact that the changing nature of our technological system and the changes in human relations which it is bringing about are proceeding at differential rates in different countries. Attempts to organize a world system must take into consideration the fact that the necessary changes in human relations can be introduced only through the sphere of technology, and that these changes will of necessity be incorporated within the existing organizations in the different regions of the world. In so doing, however, the equilibrium will be disturbed, and if the change required is too great, a period of instability will result before a new equilibrium will appear. In order that this can be done most effectively, the changes must be made within the framework of existing regional systems. These must be granted local initiative and local autonomy, necessary for the successful operation of the larger organization by which the world technology can be stabilized.

*Conclusion:*

The technological changes by which man can be emancipated from too great a dependence upon nature and which will necessarily occur unless the world goes completely to wrack and ruin can cause at the time of their introduction relatively great or little harm. If they are put into operation without regard for the necessities of the systems already operating, contrary to the organization of the institutions which have already been worked out among the people concerned, then serious compensatory reactions will take place. If however an attempt is made to determine what the ordered interactions of the individuals actually are, the techniques can be introduced in such a way that the system is only momentarily disturbed, and can easily achieve a new state of equilibrium. If this is done, and to do so requires careful planning on the local level, we can look forward to the time when a world equilibrium will have become as habitual and as stable as the peasant communities of the past. Unlike these, however, they will provide a free system within which every individual can achieve an equilibrium and an effective adjustment to his world.

## HOW A WORLD EQUILIBRIUM CAN BE ORGANIZED AND ADMINISTERED

BY ELIOT D. CHAPPLE

Presented March 11, 1942

*Introduction:*

How can a world equilibrium be organized and administered? Any answer we choose to give to such a question can by necessity be only a partial one. Yet answer it we must if we are to survive, and our hopes of success will be immeasurably strengthened if we base our plans on the principles of human relations.

We have to begin with human beings, and with human beings who have already been conditioned to habitual routines of interaction. You have heard something of the constraints which these routines will impose upon any world system, and of the modifications and limitations upon our relations to others which we can expect from our present-day technology. Any plan for the organization of a world equilibrium must be based upon these operating realities.

Equally important in planning an organization, however, are the steps by which one's plans are put into effect, for these steps determine the form of the plan which results. Unless all the combatants disintegrate through exhaustion, the end of the war will be a military victory, followed by military occupation of the conquered countries. An organizational plan must, therefore, take into consideration the basic fact that a military occupation with military governors, martial law, and emergency measures must be transformed into an effective political system. This transformation must be carefully planned—the automatic tendencies of systems of human relations to return to a state of equilibrium must be guided within calculated channels. Otherwise, armies of occupation will tend to become permanent and will then be rationalized as a preparatory and educational interlude for a political adulthood which will never come. In the frantic haste of victory, the carpet-bagger, whether the simple exploiter of our Civil War days or the more sophisticated Commission used after World War I, often seems to be the only means by which political order can be restored. As history has shown, such reconstruction methods can never bring about a restoration of local autonomy within the framework of a centralized control which will achieve equilibrium. Carpetbaggers of every form and carpetbagging policies towards the vanquished act as disturbing

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forces on the system, bringing about violent compensatory reactions on the part of the governed.

We cannot hope, therefore, to implement the Atlantic Charter and bring about a world equilibrium, unless these facts are realized. We must learn the bitter lesson, that we have to plan for human beings, and not for "economic men" or "political animals" or "men of good will." We have to plan, in other words, according to the ways in which people actually do behave, and not as we think they ought to behave. And our plans must contain the steps by which they are to be put into operation, steps which must be taken at the moment of military victory, and not delayed for some more propitious future which will never come.

*The Relative Efficiency of Totalitarian and Democratic Systems:*

Changes in the interaction rates of individuals are the disturbing forces in systems of human relations. When such changes occur, the equilibrium is upset, and the changes in the autonomic nervous system which result include compensatory changes in the interaction rates. In our ordinary experience, we recognize emotion by such changes, and we recognize too the necessity for the individual to blow off steam, to complain about the injustice done him, and to seek redress and thus, in more precise terms, to reestablish his state of equilibrium.

We have already discussed how the technical activities of every day life provide the context within which interaction takes place, and in which individuals adjust to others, or become seriously maladjusted. The organizational structure of every institution is built up on routine events in which one person acts and a group responds, and through which the technical activities can be performed at given frequencies and in habitual ways. When disturbances occur in the adjustments of individuals, compensatory reactions take place within their habitual relations to others. If these reactions alleviate the disturbance, equilibrium is restored. The efficient organization or system is that in which these reactions produce adjustments within the system rapidly and along well-defined channels.

In designing the plans by which effective organizations are set up, planning experts have already worked out many procedures which, if properly



applied, can help the officers of administration to maintain a stable state within their organization, and to eliminate disturbances rapidly. In general, however the administrators use even these procedures to a limited extent only, in fact they usually apply them only to the upper brackets of the administrative hierarchy, and rarely consider the needs of those on the lower rungs. Thus they fail to take into consideration the essential unity of the system and its need to be treated as a whole.

The result is that most compensatory reactions run down the line of authority, and each administrator restores his own equilibrium, when disturbed by a higher-up, by acting upon his subordinates. At the bottom level, there is no ordered channel; the governed have only each other as outlets. In such an organizational system, which we have recently come to call totalitarian, there is no provision for modification of administrative action except by direct appeal up the line, and such an action brings about a compensatory reaction in the opposite direction. Where disturbances occur with any frequency, the flow of actions down the line requires the individuals at the bottom to be highly conditioned so as to respond automatically to the actions of the hierarchy. Each such individual can find compensatory outlets only in persons upon whom he is permitted or encouraged to act—his wife and his children, members of out-cast groups, and members of other nations. A totalitarian system, therefore, prevents any modification of the structure from below, in response to changes in environmental and technological conditions. Yet it is on the bottom level that such changes are continually occurring. If the disturbances passing down the line are too frequent and their intensity becomes too great, the necessary result is conflict; where possible, rebellion, where not, non-cooperation, restriction of output, sabotage, and an increasing incidence of mental disorders.

Even though systems of this kind have operated for brief periods in the past in different countries, they are necessarily unstable, and in times of technological crises, subject to automatic and violent compensatory reactions. Under present conditions, it is highly doubtful that such systems can be as effective as was formerly possible. In peasant communities, the administrative hierarchy operated at a much lower frequency due to the low interactional requirements of the agricultural methods then in use. It was therefore possible for such a group to maintain its equilibrium even under a totalitarian regime by virtue of becoming

a self-contained, highly isolated system with its relations to the outside world cut to a minimum.

Our modern mass-production technology depends not only upon the complex interrelations of countless individuals within the manufacturing institutions; it also depends upon mass-consumption. The administrative hierarchies necessary to make such a system work operate at a high frequency; an assembly line cannot be run by absentee foremen. The complex adjustments of individuals within such a system which must occur if it is to attain a state of equilibrium cannot take place if the individuals are emotionally disturbed—a necessary result of totalitarian conditions in times of peace. When war is over, and a world-hegemony has been reached, aggression on individuals external to the system no longer provides any kind of outlet. Unless actual outlets within the system are provided, no equilibrium is in fact possible.

As an alternative to the so-called totalitarian system, there has been devised the democratic or representative system, in which the people at the bottom of the administrative hierarchy are able to act upon the administrators. As everyone knows, the representative system is one in which I, the governed person, the man in the street, am able to compensate for a disturbance to my equilibrium by acting upon my representative, whom I choose, who in turn is able to act upon the administrator, in order to bring about changes in *his* behavior which will restore my equilibrium. It is a circular system in which the compensatory mechanisms are part of the organizational structure.

The democratic system is merely a representative system in which all of the administered who are adults are members of the class of those who are acted upon, and who in turn act upon their chosen representatives. The degree to which this system is effective in maintaining a system in equilibrium is a quantitative problem; whether in fact a system can be called democratic is again a question of quantity. In many countries it became, the fashion, at one time or another, to set up such a representative system, and the unwary who looked at the form and not at the working system of human relations spoke of such countries as democratic. The facts of the case were that they were merely disguised totalitarian systems, set up to make the people think that they had a voice in the government, and thus to lull them into a state of equilibrium. Since the representatives chosen by the people had no power, and the actions of the people upon these men produced no results, this ruse served only temporarily to alleviate the



disturbance of the individual citizens. The fact that the representatives could bring no change in the administration meant that the circular system was not in operation, hence the governed obtained no modification of the administrative policy, and the basic disturbances inherent to such a system soon returned. In this country, a similar situation existed in the so-called company unions or employee representation plans formerly the vogue in industry; when, as was true in all except rare cases, the employees found that they had no opportunity of acting on any matters which were of real importance to them, they soon lost interest and sought compensatory outlets elsewhere.

If we are to organize a world equilibrium, we will tend towards one or the other of these two solutions of the problem. We may obtain the totalitarian solution in fact, while having the democratic solution in theory. In our opinion, the most efficient system of organization in terms of the realities of human relations, is the democratic one. It provides habitual channels within which compensatory reactions may operate to restore the equilibrium of the system. It enables one to introduce technological changes without running too much risk of causing severe disturbances of which the administrators became aware too late. It is the only method by which large scale organizations can be run efficiently. And it provides for a retention of local autonomy and local initiative within a world-wide order. The criticisms so frequently made of the inefficiency of democratic systems as compared to the totalitarian are due not to the fact of having too much democracy but of having too little. Inefficient organization is the result either of the failure to use present-day knowledge of organizational principles in setting up the organization, or of the existence within the government of a totalitarian sub-system which is successfully able to short-circuit all attempts to bring about changes in its administrative procedures. A brief examination of actual cases drawn from history will indicate to anyone that such inefficiency, with rare and temporary exceptions, is most characteristic of totalitarian regimes.

#### *The Organization of a World Equilibrium:*

If the democratic system provides the most efficient way we know of organizing a world equilibrium, the problem is, how can such a system actually be put into operation on a world-wide basis? The previous speakers have sketched for you something of the materials with which we have to work; it is my task to outline the general

framework of a system of organization in which major sources of disturbance will be eliminated.

You have already heard how important a part technological routines play in determining the interaction of individuals. The greater part of every individual's day is spent in technical activities, and the complex interdependence of individuals produced by our present technology has brought about the formation of regional systems, throughout the world, each of which can attain a stable state of equilibrium. For this reason, in outlining the basis for organization of a United States of the World, each state which forms an administrative unit must not be an ethnic or linguistic group, or even a nationality; it must be a natural geographic-technological region, within which trade and the exploitation of natural resources occurs within the bounds set by natural barriers, climate, and the common highways of travel, regardless of race, language, or ethnic identity. Examples of such areas are the Danube Valley, the Mediterranean, the coasts of the Baltic and the North Seas, and so on. I shall not attempt to list all these unit regions or to set their boundaries. The exact limits for each area can only be fixed by determining whether or not the frequencies of interaction occurring within the technological institutions of a given area possess the properties of a system in equilibrium.

A word perhaps ought to be said to explain why we regard nationality, ethnicity, language, and also religion as unimportant in the formation of these natural geographic-technological regions. The organizing principle which we have followed is to select those conditioned routines which bring about the greatest amount of interaction with the stablest frequency, and to build upon them a homogeneous political unit. Trade and manufacturing bring people into habitual association whatever their race or creed. Ethnic or linguistic divisions which were so much in the consciousness of statesmen after World War I are symbolic in character; they refer to habitual ways of interacting which had, at some time in the past, a technological and environmental basis. The growing pains of the modern world system, seen in the present war, are largely the result of the necessities of the existing governments to achieve equilibrium for political institutions built upon the habitual routines of nineteenth century technology. Each change resulting from twentieth century technology, brought about compensatory reactions within the political systems, and these in turn brought about greater dislocations in the habitual routines imposed by

environment and technology on the people who were at the same time subject to the rule of these outmoded political institutions. Yugoslavia, for example, was united after the last peace on the basis of language, and the struggles between the Croats and the Serbs, which have gone on ever since, reflect the essential geographical and technological disunity of this artificially created kingdom.

Where stable technological systems exist, however, people of diverse languages, and belonging to different ethnic groups, have been able to live and work together harmoniously. The Island of Great Britain, Switzerland, are but two of many examples where this has occurred. And in all these cases, when the interactions change, the symbols change with them. Thus Romansch, Italian, French, and German become Swiss. The equilibrium within these countries is not based upon the sharing in common of certain symbols, but upon the stable adjustments of the individuals concerned. Stable political institutions can only be based upon the framework of a stable technological system, upon the necessities by which people are brought face to face in their daily life.

Once regional states have been delimited, the political system for a United States of the World can be set up. The machinery in question must involve a democratic and representative system both for the regional states and for the Federal System with the emphasis within the regions on local autonomy and local initiative. The concern of the government of the United States of the World would be upon the administration of those aspects of human relations which involve the interrelations of the regional states. Its function, therefore, would be to maintain the world equilibrium by controlling and supervising the systems of communication and transportation, the allocation of raw materials and the conduct of trade and exchange between the several regions.

Basic to such a system would be the possession of a world police force, including an army, a navy, and an air force, with no rivals permitted. Of necessity, then the tools of modern warfare—planes, tanks, etc.—are reserved to the Federal system, and the regional states would be permitted only militias to keep the peace. Unless this provision is incorporated within the organizational framework, a United States of the World cannot operate. Every institution, to be effective, has to be able to enforce its decisions, to compel those who will not respond to its authority to learn to do so. Within a democratic system, the use of such power is subject to the control of the gov-

erned; it can be exercised without bringing about fundamental maladjustments.

We cannot give you a detailed blueprint of the workings of such a system. It would take time, money and the collaboration of a technical staff to produce such a scheme. We can, however, emphasize several principles which are of fundamental importance in its successful operation. The first of these is that every regional state, whether it be composed of victors or vanquished, whites, yellows, browns or blacks, must be a member of the world system on an equal basis. The administrative hierarchy of the United States of the world would then be made up of individuals from all the regional states, and The Federal Civil Service would operate much like the old Chinese mandarin system, open to all and based upon competitive examinations. The exclusion of any group for reasons of expediency or revenge or to maintain a pre-war system of control will only bring about new sources of disequilibrium. People learn only by doing, and democratic systems can be made to work only if the individuals concerned are given the responsibility. Many peoples who have been excluded from large political systems on grounds of political immaturity, as for example the Hindus, have in fact practiced such governmental methods in their local groups. Once people have been put into a position of inferiority within an organizational framework, it is to the interest of even the well-meaning to keep them there, since, if any change is made, the equilibrium of the superior groups will be disturbed. Now, however, the disturbance is so great and so general that the time has come to set such people free.

Even Germans and Japanese must be included in our policy, however painful and bitter our feelings towards them. Their totalitarian institutional systems, operating under the restrictions imposed upon them drove them automatically on their present course. It is of fundamental importance that, this time, they shall not again be provided with the means and the incentive to undergo such violent compensatory reactions, but that on the contrary, positive action shall be taken so that with them as with others a democratic system can operate effectively within a regional framework.

#### *The Administration of a World Equilibrium:*

As I pointed out at the beginning of this talk, the careful elaboration of an organizational framework within which a world system can operate is an idle effort unless each step by which it is to be put in operation is planned with equal care. In

dealing with human beings, each of whom has specific physiological properties, we must continually keep in mind that they behave in accordance with these properties. Once they are conditioned to a particular way of behaving, in terms of which they achieve a state of equilibrium, they tend to remain in that state, and to return to it after minor disturbances. For this reason a basic principle of administration is that the means determine the end; once you condition individuals to a particular way of doing things, it is difficult to change the habitual systems of relations in which they interact.

Once the war is over and victory has been won, those who are responsible for setting up a new world order which they hope to make stable will be confronted with their most dangerous hour of decision. Each step that they take at the time—when the several countries of the world are in upheaval, when the victors and vanquished alike are trying under the stress of old patterns to return to some kind of a balance—will determine whether or not the next step will be possible. Temporary measures which are put into operation because no decision has been made as to what permanent steps are needed will themselves become permanent measures, and will shape the organizational structure. It is consequently necessary, in setting up a plan for a regional system of federated states, to see what conditions need to be met at the outset.

At the end of the war, the victors will be faced immediately with the problem of getting the technological systems back to a working peace-time basis. This means that not merely will it be the responsibility of the victors to disband the armies and to feed the starving populations, but to see to it that manufacturing and trade shall return to some kind of stability. We are all of us conscious of the problem involved in our own country, and it has been the concern of private agencies and of the Federal government to set up plans by which full employment can be maintained and the productive operation of our industrial system transformed into peacetime products. But this problem must be faced in every region of the globe, and the successful implementation of a technology capable of attaining equilibrium cannot be worked out after the armistice is signed; it must be prepared beforehand.

If such planning is done in detail before the war is over, it will then be possible to utilize the necessities of feeding the populations of the world, and of repairing their economic systems, as ways of conditioning the individuals in these populations to the new political system. If the framework is drawn up in advance and ready to put into opera-

tion, those who wish to introduce this system can use the administrative necessities of the post-war period for this purpose. Representative systems can be set up in the several regions to aid the administrators in feeding the populations, and in working out and directing the technological changes needed to provide reemployment for the armies. In this way there need be no period of temporizing in which the old habits and systems can reassert themselves; compensatory reactions can be directed within new channels and not left to find their way back into the old.

Such plans cannot be directed and administered unless continuous control is maintained over the developing systems of human relations. Systems of human relations, like all other systems, vary within fixed limits when they reach equilibrium. It must be part of the routine activities of the administration to take periodic samples within the different regions, in order to determine whether or not changes are occurring outside the limits of tolerance of the system in question and to take the necessary administrative action. By the use of such control methods, it will be possible to estimate the effect of a new technique upon the equilibrium, and to see to it that each increase in technological efficiency is fitted to the existing organization so that it produces an increase in the adjustment of human beings.

Such a democratic system, however, capable of attaining a state of equilibrium on a worldwide scale, can never operate unless we plan what we are going to do, long before we are called upon to do it. The conversion of a single nation to readiness for war requires years of careful planning before an M-day is feasible. The far more complex organizational framework for a United States of the World cannot be left to the chance inspiration of the day after peace has been won. We must have in our hands a careful outline of the precise steps to be taken and the order in which they are to be timed, as well as an organizational blueprint for the system as it is intended to operate.

If we are to succeed, time is of the essence. The longer we wait after the final victory, the more time is given for the various countries to return to a status quo ante bellum, and the harder it will become to introduce new systems of relations to which people must become conditioned. Our plans for V-day must be fully worked out, ready to put into operation if and when the event occurs. Lack of preparation for peace can be even more fatal than lack of preparation for war, for unless we prepare for peace, we can never hope to see an end to war.



## VII

### INTERNATIONAL UTOPIAS

By ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR.

Presented May 12, 1942

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"Let us conceive of the whole group of civilized nations as being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great confederation, bound to a joint action and working toward a common result; a confederation whose members have a due knowledge both of the past, out of which they all proceed, and of one another. This was the ideal of Goethe, and it is an ideal which will impose itself upon the thoughts of our modern societies more and more."

In this intellectual and spiritual confederation envisaged by Matthew Arnold, we scholars brought to maturity whatever within us is good for others. The Tercentenary of 1936 honored it as well as Harvard. That was its last blossoming. Already the Nazis in Germany and Franco in Spain had begun the long sequence of tragedies which, for the second time in our lives, has torn asunder the Western world of art and science and ideas. For politicians and soldiers let it be a war between groups of nations. For us it is a civil war within the single community of thought.

Arnold might assume in 1879 that this intellectual and spiritual confederation could continue in a Europe which was for other purposes divided into irregular compartments, that its unity would not be severed by the barriers of tariff walls and frontier fortresses. The two civil wars, thirty-five and sixty years later, have shown us the falsity of his assumption. National boundaries can impede the free flow of thought more than they do the less sensitive currents of trade. The confederation of the spirit envisaged at Weimar is superseded by the New Order conceived in Berchtesgaden.

And yet the ideal of Goethe and Arnold is one of the chief reasons for my belief that the International Utopias of which I shall speak are more than the baseless fabric of a vision. Europe was one in the ways that they accounted most important. That makes it easier for it to become one again in a greater number of ways. This confederation of the mind and spirit was real and had been real for centuries. There is something there capable of taking on new functions and influencing still more human activities.

A second reason for confidence is economic. I need not indulge in commonplaces about the annihilation of space, but merely illustrate what I mean from the war itself. The mobility of the

very tools of destruction—airplanes, troop-trains, and tanks passing rapidly from Narvik to Crete—shows the growing meaninglessness of the old national boundaries. So does the coordination of factories creating those tools of destruction. However vile the present purposes, Europe is unified industrially as never before. May it not be possible to change the purposes and yet preserve the unity?

As a third witness let me summon Hitler himself. His New Order is a negation of nationalism and racial isolation. It is federation—of a very bad kind, surely, but yet it is federation, which Europe never had before. Countries formerly separated are now associated as master and slaves—they may later be associated as comrades in a common enterprise. A conqueror sometimes benefits his foes more than himself. Napoleon erased the outworn boundaries of many petty German states, but the resulting unified Germany passed to the very dynasty he fought. So Hitler may be wiping out wider boundaries so that soon the agents of a democracy may govern as uninterruptedly as his minions do now.

The instability which succeeded the Fall of the Roman Empire has persisted until the present day. Rival nations sliding about over each other have produced periodic earthquakes like sliding strata of rock. This war, in its early stages at least, is only the latest of a series of often senseless struggles, wars of this or that succession, whose repercussions used to loose the Indians on our forefathers and now have turned the Japanese upon us. To an American vexed by these constant quarrels, they seem likely to continue so long as an area smaller than our own is split among over a dozen independent political units each pulling in a different direction against the others and against the growing strength of the uniform techniques of industry which ignore national boundaries. In a sense, Europe has always struggled to reinstate the *pax Romana*, and now may be the best chance it has ever had to do so, albeit in a nobler form than either Trajan or Hitler conceived.

In short, with all our misfortunes, a central government for Europe—or even for the world—becomes more practicable than it was in 1919. We do not know yet what spirit will imbue that gov-



ernment. Oddly enough, its spirit seems likely to emanate from Germany whichever way you look at it. On the other hand, the New Order of Hitler, on the other, the European confederation dreamed of by Goethe and Immanuel Kant. Or shall there be a third course—all the old independent states once more?

May I venture an analogy from a remote part of the world? During the centuries when Greece was falling apart and Rome was expanding, China was divided like modern Europe into many warring states. They fought with traditional etiquette, changed boundaries kaleidoscopically, yet still remained numerous and bellicose. Meanwhile, the teachings of Buddha and Confucius spread regardless of boundaries. Meanwhile, the irrigation systems so necessary for Chinese intensive agriculture went on expanding. The interdependence of these canals called for a unified control of all the water in China. Nevertheless, political divisions threatened to wreck what should culturally and economically have been a single community. About the time of the first war between the Romans and the Carthaginians, a people called the Ch'in started conquering the rest of China. They did not fight like gentlemen, as other Chinese did. They beheaded their defeated foes. In 221 B.C., just before Hannibal crossed the Alps, they overcame their last antagonists, the Ch'u. At last there was one control of the water system. Bad as the Ch'in were, they had done the job. And just because they were bad, they were replaced in fifteen years by the Han dynasty, the first great rulers of a unified China. Ever since Chinese historians have hated the Ch'in.<sup>2</sup> It may be possible that the Nazis have with even greater cruelty accomplished the task of unifying Europe so that more enlightened successors may soon do good that was never possible before.

Along with these three factors working for unification, we have an entirely different reason which impels men powerfully to try to bring about some sort of unification. I refer, of course, to the inescapable evidence that the alternative is recurring warfare. We know well that science has made war vastly more costly and more destructive, and will accelerate this tendency; that it is increasingly unlikely for a war to be localized between two countries—once started, it spreads rapidly over the world. We know that the intervals between wars can be very short unless we do something to make peace effective. It is just as well, perhaps, that the Second World War came so soon after the First, so that we cannot ignore this

lesson. We know that hereafter, unless a better order be established, even an interval of peace will be almost as bad as war, for hereafter nobody will dare to refrain from preparing, preparing, preparing, at enormous cost. You can have strong defense, or you can have civilization, but you cannot have both. Even peace will be a total organization for war, crushing out education, recreation, books, family life. This road leads straight to mass suicide—a feverish peace followed by what Kant described as "A war of extermination, where the process of annihilation would strike both parties at once . . . would bring about perpetual peace in the great graveyard of the human race."

So there is, more than ever before, eagerness to establish something new which will prevent this ruin of our race. And the opportunity will come after victory. What shall we do with it? What sort of new world is desired? Several sorts, in fact. Many books and magazine articles have already broached different schemes, although the subject of post-war organization has not yet received much attention in daily newspapers. There is some danger that people will get so bewildered by all the overlapping and conflicting proposals that they will throw up their hands in despair and stop thinking about the whole matter. That would be a great misfortune, for an enlightened public opinion on the right use of the victory for which we strive will do much to save us from throwing that victory away.

On the other hand, some persons incline to seize on a single scheme and fervently hail it as a cure-all with no thought of adverse criticisms and alternative possibilities. Fanatical devotion to one plan at all costs wearies listeners and alienates supporters of other plans. Competing zealots may raise such a clamor that they will silence each other and disgust everybody else. So no features of any international scheme will win general acceptance, and we shall be back to some form of the balance of power.

Consequently, it is wise for Americans to consider more than one scheme, yet not too many schemes. There are four main types of International Utopias that have considerable influence. Each of them stands out pretty distinctly despite many divergences among its supporters about details. Consequently, it will simplify the problems of post-war organizations to distinguish these four schemes from one another, and illustrate each of the four by means of a brief description of a significant book.

At the outset, I want to make it plain that all four plans are like the famous recipe for hare soup,



which began: "First catch your hare." Every International Utopia presupposes the downfall of Hitler and the other Axis rulers.

### I

The first plan is to improve and strengthen the League of Nations. In twenty years it showed several kinds of defects. Its most outstanding failure was the breakdown of economic sanctions against Italy during the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Hence there has arisen a strong movement in favor of stronger sanctions and more effective methods for bringing sanctions into operation. It is to be made really a League to Enforce Peace. An able and very thorough presentation of methods for this purpose is made by an Englishman, Lord Davies, in a book of seven hundred pages entitled "The Problem of the Twentieth Century." Lord Davies is an elderly man. He became the active head of The New Commonwealth, an international society devoted to the establishment of an international police and other devices for strengthening the League. It published a number of research monographs. His book suffers from being older than the other books I shall discuss. The first edition was published in 1930 and a revised edition in 1934. Hence it is not in form a post-war plan, but its reasoning is capable of adaptation to the situation which confronts us.

After a full and informative analysis of older proposals for international unification, like those of the Abbé Saint-Pierre and Kant, he takes up more recent expressions of the idea of an international police force. I was surprised to learn that in 1910 both Houses of Congress passed a resolution asking President Taft to appoint a commission of five to consider among other aspects of disarmament "the expediency of . . . constituting the combined navies of the world an international police force for the preservation of universal peace."<sup>3</sup> Taft took some steps but no cooperation then seemed feasible. Although Wilson at Paris dropped force out of the League, this was inconsistent with his utterances of January 22, 1917, in his speech on Peace without Victory:

"Mere agreements will not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind."

Lord Davies would carry out this proposal of Wilson and expand the idea in the congressional resolution so as to include an army and an air force as well as a navy.

Under his plan there would be three types of police: (1) the ordinary police we have now to maintain local order; (2) a national body of police in each country to maintain national order and supplement the local police; (3) an international police force to maintain international order. Their two principal functions would be to repel aggression and to enforce the decisions of the World Court and arbitration tribunals. Unlike the Holy Alliance, the League is not to intervene in the domestic affairs of either members or non-members. A fortiori another state is to be kept from so interfering.

One of Davies's most interesting points is that the progress of invention has now made possible a differentiation of weapons, so that the international police can be armed much more powerfully than will be allowed for any national body. Some sort of differentiation has long been common inside a country. The local police carry clubs or at most revolvers, while the national guard and the army carry rifles. According to the plan of Lord Davies, each national army would be limited to weapons existing before 1914, whereas the monopoly of the newer and more powerful weapons would be possessed by the international police. These would include submarines, airplanes, poison gas, tanks, the new heavy artillery and bombs. All these weapons would be forbidden to the national armies. Such a differentiation was proposed by France at a disarmament conference in 1932. The Washington conference of 1921 also furnishes a precedent, for differentiation was there used in a negative fashion to forbid certain powerful weapons and reduce others while some weapons were left unrestricted. If the proposal of Lord Davies could be effectively carried out, it would have two great merits. In the first place, it might very well make the international force more powerful than any combination of member states with their limited equipment. A combination of outside states would be met by an even stronger force as I shall show later. On the other hand, his plan would not impair the ability of each state to maintain law and order in its own territory. The burden of the international force would be met by contributions from member states in personnel, arms, and money. States which failed to contribute would be unable to participate in the management of the League, whereas in the past no such

penalty was imposed and Peru even obtained a seat on the council after it had been years behind on its annual assessment. A delinquent state would also be denied the use of the international force for the protection of its own frontiers. Another new device would be an international general staff which would render the international police effective and mobile. Thus sanctions would be organized before the crime was committed, whereas the actual League has been greatly handicapped because the economic sanctions which it could use had to be worked out after the violation of law. For instance it was several months after Italy invaded Ethiopia before the League could decide what to do. The international force would embrace all the instruments of coercion. If it consisted of a navy alone, as Congress proposed in 1910, it could not have prevented the German army from overrunning Europe in 1914. Hence an army and air force must be included. Perhaps the development of aviation will eventually make an international air force sufficient.

How shall the international police force be organized? Davies describes three alternative schemes:

(1) It will consist entirely of quotas furnished by the member states, each of which will control its own quota and pay its cost in time of peace. However, a general staff at international headquarters will organize these scattered quotas, and on mobilization it will take them over under international command. This was the French scheme at the Versailles Peace Conference. One advantage is that it would cause a minimum amount of interference with existing national establishments and yet bring about considerable disarmament in each country. However, there are several disadvantages. There is no adequate guarantee that a nation would meet its obligations when the crisis arose, and thus the League might lack the support it had counted on. This uncertainty would discourage apprehensive nations from diminishing their national forces. Also, it would fail to eliminate competition between the war offices and admiralities of different countries. A national staff would resent the intrusion of the international staff. When each nation retained financial control during peace it would be tempted to spend more in making more, to prepare peace industries for transformation into munition factories, and to invent new weapons for its own use. Secession is made easy, just as the southern state militias in 1861 became the Confederate Army. Finally, this

scheme disregards the hopeful new opportunity for differentiation of weapons.

(2) At the other extreme is a complete self-contained international force, with the abolition of all national forces except as they are necessary to maintain internal order. This scheme would have the advantages of eliminating all competition between countries, obtaining comprehensive disarmament at once, producing increased mobility of the international force and simplifying the problem of organization. On the other hand, the disadvantages are numerous. The League would have to possess a bigger force than it would ever be likely to use. This force would be much more expensive to maintain than national quotas. Even if some of it could be kept within international territory, considerable portions would have to be garrisoned inside member states, which would cause disputes. The problem of maintaining internal order would become much more difficult. Each country would be stripped to its local police who would have no national army to fall back on. Finally, since there would be no liaison between national and international staffs, the people of each state would be wholly cut off from the international force and might cease to regard it as a genuine part of their own defense system.

(3) Therefore, Lord Davies favors a compromise scheme. He would have a composite force: both national quotas and a specialized contingent which should be enlisted, equipped, and controlled by the League. This plan was proposed by General Gerard, a far-seeing Frenchman, in 1923. Here Lord Davies's ideas of differentiation of weapons would have full scope. The separate national quotas would be armed with older weapons, and the international contingent with newer weapons. He finds many advantages in this scheme. First, the central contingent would have unmistakable superiority over the armies of member states, which would be decisive in an emergency. It could also hold off outsiders long enough to give time to assemble the national quotas, and the combined force would then be overwhelming. Second, competition in the invention and manufacture of new weapons would be abolished. Third, substantial disarmament would be produced unless a non-member state starts competing. Fourth, it would give permanence to the League, for a member would be unlikely to withdraw once it had surrendered its most potent weapons. Fifth, the sovereignty of states is preserved for they would control their quotas, and the central contingent is dependent on their contributions. Sixth, the

scheme is practicable. The technical arrangements of each country go on, of the older sort. The international police is small with specialists as aviators, tankmen, etc. Its small size simplifies the problem of international barracks and bases. It also renders the central force very mobile. Seventh, the continuance of a liaison between the national staffs and the international staff makes every nation directly interested in the efficiency of the central contingent and in fruitful cooperation with the League military authorities. Eighth, self-defense is recognized in a relative form. The frontiers will be guarded by their own national quota, then by the rapid arrival of the central contingent, and finally by the later mustering of the quotas of other members of the League. Thus the third scheme meets the objections to the first two.

The international force will owe allegiance to the League like the present Secretariat and will presumably cease to be citizens of their former states. The headquarters and bases will be independent territory of the League, like the District of Columbia and the federal forts in our country. During a twenty-five year experimental period, which Lord Davies shrewdly advises, these territories might be merely taken on lease. The bases should be chosen for their strategical position, access to the sea, and suitability for fleets of airplanes. They should not be too close to any great powers. He proposes Palestine as the District of Columbia, because it satisfies these requirements and has strong associations for citizens of so many countries. Other strategical points to be occupied include Suez, Panama, Singapore, Djibouti, Corsica, the Hawaiian Islands, Constantinople, the Aaland Islands, and Yap. It might also occupy neutralized zones like the Rhine Valley, the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and the Great Lakes. Small states might lease part of their territories as part of their contribution, receiving full protection in return. For example, Albania, Monaco, Latvia, Honduras, Newfoundland, and Haiti. The League would have its own aircraft factories; and it would ration orders for other munitions among many states, storing them at international bases.

Although this sounds very elaborate and some details would certainly be rejected by the United States, it seems possible that the international police would become less costly as the world became increasingly habituated to peace. Lord Davies wisely observes that a good centralized police force tends to eliminate all force, including itself.

In order that the international police force may be satisfactorily organized and operated Lord Davies would remove a second usual objection to the Covenant, namely, the requirement of unanimity for most acts of the Council. He would have an executive body capable of managing the police and of enforcing sanctions and the decisions of international tribunals. The prompt action of the executive must be assured by the residence of representatives of the member-states at the capital. The actual executive must not be too large or unwieldy. Countries should be excluded which do not maintain international order or fulfill their obligations, including the payment of contributions. The apportionment of contributions would be based on wealth and other factors as well as population. This does give big states an advantage, but they already possess this now for the purpose of piling up armaments. They will be equal in the judicial sphere, the privilege of representation on the assembly and freedom to criticize. Small states as a class will be represented on the executive body. Instead of the rule of unanimity he would substitute a two-thirds vote, thinking a majority too much liable to make mistakes.

Several objections to the plan of an international police are discussed by Lord Davies himself and also in a shorter book on "Theory and Practice of International Police," by Professor Hans Wehberg, a German scholar long teaching in Geneva (1934). Here are some of them:

The force may suffer from disloyalty within, because policemen will be more devoted to their countries of origin than to the League. In reply writers point to the success of the French Foreign Legion, the Swiss Army, the composite army of the Allies in the World War, and the frequency with which men change their allegiance on migration.

Secondly it is urged that a single nation or group of nations could overcome the police either by a sudden attack or by secretly acquiring a considerable supply of the strong weapons. Lord Davies deals pretty well with the danger of sudden attacks, in view of the mobility and strategic locations of the international contingent. The quota of the attacked nation would be able to hold up the invasion for a while, so long as the invaders possess the same sort of weapons. However, this reply is greatly weakened if the invaders have secretly acquired airplanes and tanks. Lord Davies does not sufficiently show how the monopoly of these strong weapons in the central contingent is to be maintained, or how a member country is

to be prevented from inventing and using new devices. This seems a particularly serious danger.

Third, one power might try to get control of the central contingent. Fourth, this might go in for politics on its own and behave like Wallenstein's army in the Thirty-Years War or the Roman army in bad periods of the Empire, ready to go anywhere under a leader who promised high pay and abundant loot. The reply of Lord Davies to these two objections is that treachery and conspiracy would be difficult in a force with three divisions for land, sea, and air, each having a separate head for a limited period of time, and all paid by the executive. He doubts if one state or one leader could influence all the heads and all the divisions. Although I am not entirely satisfied by this reply, Lord Davies goes on to give a better reason: "Every scheme has its risks. Every federation has been faced with the possibility of the disruption of its central force. Every government is liable to be deprived suddenly of its sanctions. These possibilities are inherent in any political system, national or international, but it does not follow that they will be realized. The effective safeguards are to be found in the public opinion of the countries participating in the confederation, and in the common sense of the international police."

Over and above this, the international police must not be viewed in isolation. The success of this device depends much on the general strength of the League as a guardian not merely of formal international law but even more of the idea of justice in a broad sense. The peoples must want to cooperate in the League, not in order to keep down a certain group of states, but in order to serve the well-being of the world. In other words, security and disarmament and just international relations are three interdependent factors. Lack of any of the three interferes with the two others. It is proper to isolate each of these factors for purposes of study and detailed discussion, but in the end they must be considered together and all treated satisfactorily.

Therefore, it is important to cure not only the two defects in the Covenant already mentioned—weakness of sanctions and the unanimity rule, but also to remove other defects which have produced a strong sense of injustice. Three of these may be mentioned. First, the handling of minorities is poor, and produces a feeling of insecurity in the majority and of injustice on the other side of the boundary line. One suggestion is periodical visits by a League inspector, who would ascertain the facts, deflate peevish complaints, cut through

the excuses of the majority, and often be able to effect compromises before quarrels become serious. Also a Minority Commission at the capital would receive periodic reports from governments with minorities and be able to question their officials. Next, although the mandate system is an advance on previous practice, several writers advocate that all non-self-governing territories should be administered directly by the League, which should undertake to fit them for independence and conserve their raw materials for the benefit of the natives as well as that of consumers generally and not to profit investors or governments. Finally, there must be an effective machinery for the peaceful change of treaties and boundaries which have been rendered unsuitable by new conditions. The powers of the League under Article XIX have been narrowly interpreted and never used. Some writers would transfer the power to make just changes from the Council to the World Court, but any lawyer will realize the danger of trying to combine the judicial settlement of disputes which are suitable for the application of general rules of law with the uncontrolled exercise of a vague sense of fairness. It would be much as if our Supreme Court added to its present functions the power to determine how big an income tax the rich should pay in order to provide funds for the WPA.

Even if defects in the covenant are remedied by the establishment of an international police and other devices like those described, the League is not likely to succeed unless there be also a new spirit. Of this I shall have something to say later.

## II

Instead of a League, it has been widely proposed that nations should form themselves into a Union. The difference between these two types of international organization is very important. In a League the nation is the unit. Each national government selects its representatives for the central legislature and executive groups. The central government is financed by contributions from the treasuries of the member nations. In case of any violation of international agreements, coercion is exerted on the government of the nation which is committing the violation. A Union, on the other hand, makes every human being within it the unit. The citizens of the member-nations elect their representatives to the central legislature and perhaps also vote for a chief executive official. The central body imposes taxes directly on citizens. The force of the central body is exerted against the individuals who are responsible for international wrongs. The cen-



tral government takes charge of matters of common importance like defense against aggression, while the national governments confine themselves to the affairs of their own respective territories. The difference between a League and a Union is, in a general way, like the difference between the Confederation of our thirteen states which fought the Revolution and the national government which was set up by our Constitution in 1789.

The leading advocate of a Union is Clarence K. Streit. His "Union Now," a book of three hundred pages, has gone through many editions, and societies with local offices in numerous cities to support his plan are active both in this country and in England. The book first appeared in October, 1938, shortly after the Munich crisis. Mr. Streit then proposed that fifteen North Atlantic democracies should immediately form a Union, which would be capable of growing into universal world government as other nations qualified themselves for admission by establishing popular self-government and civil liberties. His fifteen democracies were the United States, the United Kingdom and five Dominions, Switzerland, Sweden, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Finland. Unfortunately, six nations at the end of this list have since become ineligible. So, outside the United States and the British Empire, nothing is left of his nucleus of a world government except Switzerland and Sweden.

Under the Streit plan, the Union government would deal with five matters of common importance—citizenship, the maintenance and use of defense forces, customs with international free trade, money, and the postal and communications system. Other powers would be reserved to the national governments, and the Union would guarantee to each nation protection against enemies, foreign and domestic, and the maintenance of democratic self-government and those rights of man that exist in all the democracies.

In Streit's illustrative constitution the Union will have a Congress of two houses, elected by popular vote. The lower house will be roughly apportioned among the member-states according to population, while each state will have two senators except that four would come from France, Great Britain, and the United States. An Executive Board of five men will be chosen, three by popular vote, one by each house of Congress. The judicial power is vested in a High Court.

Streit argues at length that such a Union is superior to conceivable alternatives. The old balance of power can no longer keep peace, and neither

can limited alliances. "We get peace by putting so much weight surely on the side of law that the strongest possible lawbreaker cannot possibly offset it and is bound to be overwhelmed." He stresses the weakness of any League of Nations. It cannot act in time, because as he thinks, a League cannot escape the unanimity rule. To get the agreement required for action not only all the delegates must be persuaded, but also the governments behind them, and in democracies this means that the legislatures must be persuaded too. By contrast, a Union can act swiftly through a majority vote of those on the spot. Consider the speed with which New Deal measures were adopted in the United States. Furthermore, a League cannot enforce law because it must operate against a state. No big state can be coerced. You cannot indict a whole nation. Even if the League succeeds, the condemned people is resentful. What makes matters worse, the nation which is the lawbreaker in one incident still sits as judge over a different lawbreaker. Thus Italy while undergoing sanctions still took part in League hearings on Germany's violations of the Locarno Treaty. There is no sheriff in a community where every man is equally sheriff. Streit raises similar objections to a permanent League police force.

Objections about the difficulties of inaugurating the Union are met by the persuasive analogy of our own situation in 1787. The makers of our Union went straight ahead, unafraid of the future.

"Yet they lived in a time when New York was protecting its fuel interests by a tariff on Connecticut wood and its farmers by duties on New Jersey butter, when Massachusetts closed while Connecticut opened its ports to British shipping, when Boston was boycotting Rhode Island grain and Philadelphia was refusing to accept New Jersey money, when the money of Connecticut, Delaware and Virginia was sound, that of all other States was variously depreciated and that of Rhode Island and Georgia was so worthless that their governments sought to coerce the citizens into accepting it. In those days New York was massing troops on its Vermont frontier while the army of Pennsylvania was committing the atrocities of the 'Wyoming massacre' against settlers from Connecticut."

Variations of this plan for a Union have been set forth by other writers. Thus Grenville Clark, a leading New York lawyer and a Fellow of Harvard, published at the end of 1939 "A Memorandum With Regard to a New Effort to Organize Peace and Containing a Proposal for a Federation of Free Peoples." His scheme differs from Streit's in limiting the powers of the Union at

the start to defense only. Also he would add to Streit's fifteen members Argentina, Colombia, and Chile. The most influential English book appears to be W. B. Curry's "The Case for Federal Union," which adheres closely to Streit's plan. This pamphlet of over two hundred pages was published in the autumn of 1939 after the outbreak of war.

Many of these proposals for international political organization remind me of some plans for an international language. An American urges that life would be much simpler if everybody spoke English, while Mussolini predicts a Europe where Latin will once more be universally used. The originator ends where he starts, in his own country. In the same way the draft constitutions of Streit and Clark, both Americans, bear a close resemblance to the Constitution of the United States. On the other hand, an Englishman, John S. Hoyland, has produced an interesting little book of one hundred pages, "The World in Union," which though falling within Streit's general scheme makes considerable use of English experience with administrative bodies of experts. For instance, he proposes a world economic council, composed of representatives of employers, employees, and citizens generally, which would be in charge of reconstruction of areas devastated by war, and readjustments due to the introduction of free trade, from which some regions now having a high tariff would suffer for a time. This council would also bring oriental countries up to the same standard of living as western countries in order to prevent the latter from being flooded with cheap labor, and would seek to eliminate poverty all over the Union.

Hoyland has given us a better book than Streit's, which I find very heavy going. Some of the divergences are due to Hoyland's strong religious feeling, which is especially prominent in the last chapters. Unlike Streit, he wants no sanctions. "The peoples must want to come into the Union." Also Hoyland would include the Axis Powers and Russia despite the undemocratic nature of their institutions. To the objection that Union is then risky he replies that it is risky anyway and even more so if sanctions are inserted and several great powers are excluded from membership. "You have to trust the future. Take one step at a time. Do the right thing now; and believe that as you do the results will be sound and attractive enough to quell the spirit of violence and separation before it comes to strength." On the other hand, he says "There is no future for national sovereignty." It will shatter civilization.

The diminution of democracies since Streit pub-

lished "Union Now" after Munich has led him to write a second book "Union Now With Britain" (1941), proposing that the United States should at once federate with the British Empire.

Some kind of association of the English-speaking countries seems more probable than World Union or the other three schemes I am discussing.<sup>4</sup> China and Russia, for which Mr. Streit did not allow, are likely to be partners too. However desirable such cooperation of the victors, it is not an International Utopia. An association to enforce the terms of peace upon the vanquished and nurse the occupied countries back to order and prosperity may prove necessary and do its work very well, but it is only a temporary receivership although it may last for years. No four governments, however enlightened, are wise enough to run the rest of the world altruistically for decades. Sooner or later the conquered and occupied peoples will demand the return of self-government and a share in the process of world-administration. If this demand be denied indefinitely, trouble is bound to arise. Our Congress will get weary of paying a quarter of the cost of policing the world. The excluded nations will try to band together against the Big Four inside, and the so-called Union will be little more than one alliance against another. Finally, not all the internationally-minded statesmen live in the United States, the British Empire, China, and Russia. Whatever the shortcomings of the League, it revealed such statesmen in France, Germany, Scandinavia, Latin America, and elsewhere. The task of international organization will be very difficult, and it would be fatal to reject the help of the best men wherever they live.

Therefore, an association of victors should be regarded as only a transition to something wider, and the problem still remains—what shall this something else do? Even if the four principal Allied Nations now form a Union like Mr. Streit's, this cannot be forced down the throats of other countries when they do revive. When general participation becomes practicable, it will not succeed unless the scheme is reasonably satisfactory to the new members as well as the old. Everything must then be reconsidered. The result may be an expansion of the arrangement among the victors, whether Union or something looser; it may be a strengthened League of Nations; it may be one of the two schemes still to be described.

### III

The difficulties of world federation have led some writers to substitute a more modest scheme



for federation in Europe alone. An interesting book of this type is "The United States of Europe," by Alfred Bingham, who is an American and edits the magazine "Common Sense." His book was published in 1940 before the fall of France.

Bingham favors a Union resembling *Streit's*, but with smaller powers over a smaller area. He believes it best to use what we have whenever possible, rather than attempt to build a completely new and more logically perfect structure. He would omit the United States because we are less prepared to surrender our national sovereignty than are European countries; the Soviet Union, because it covers two continents and has different institutions; and the Far East, because it has its own problems. "Federations have grown up where there were some fairly obvious common interests and the possibility of a common loyalty." Europe meets these tests. The idea of European unity, though subconscious, has always existed in the European heritage. There is the common background of Greek thought, Roman Law, Christianity, the use of Latin, even the same habits and clothes. Unity was approximated by the French Revolution and Napoleon. The idea has lately been popularized by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, Rathenau, and Briand, who was partly moved by the desire to confront American prosperity with a strong Europe. Plans for a customs union have been brought forward. European workmen have been joined together by a single song, the *Internationale*. Bingham stresses the long establishment of numerous international bodies for mail, telegraphs, health, the navigation of the Danube, copyright, electric power, agriculture, banking, and the regulation of maritime affairs like lighthouses and buoys. These bodies have been called bricks without mortar. They need something vital to draw them together. Also Europe has had a considerable experience in the theory and practice of federalism in Switzerland, Germany, and the British Commonwealth, besides Russia which he would exclude.

Bingham's Union is looser than *Streit's*. He would not speak of secession one way or the other. He would not require the internal government of member states to be uniformly democratic. India shows the possibility of diverse institutions within a federation. Instead, he would meet persecution by allowing the victims to emigrate freely and take their property with them. Then he would wait for the dictatorships to alter, believing that the federal structure of Europe as a whole will encourage local democracies. Unlike most post-war plans, this book does not emphasize disarmament.

Bingham believes that armaments are a superficial symptom of deeper disorders. Peace within the United States of America, he says, is not due either to the national army or to abolition of state militias. He would like to forget the term "international police force." Coercion of a state or its inhabitants is war. The only genuine protection against civil war inside the federation is good government. Although he would meet external aggression with an international army which should have the monopoly of offensive weapons, somewhat in accordance with the plan of Lord Davies, Bingham believes that the real answer to competitive armaments is the maintenance of high standards of government which will rapidly demonstrate the advantages of European union. War will be abolished when government has replaced anarchy in areas now left to the arbitrament of force.

As to boundaries, Bingham says that ideally Europe, at least west of the Vistula, should be a single economic area with complete freedom of movement for men and materials, having merely those administrative subdivisions that prove convenient. It is not practicable to go that far now. However, one practicable and valid principle for political boundaries is to make them mean as little as possible. This is better than attempting to redraw political boundaries. "New boundaries raise as many problems as they settle. The less tinkering with boundaries the better." One way to make boundaries mean less is to have different boundaries for different purposes as in our country, where the federal reserve districts are not co-extensive with a state or with other kinds of federal regions. In the same way European political boundaries need not coincide with cultural boundaries for the language used in schools, etc., or with economic boundaries set up for labor regulations, river traffic, or the efficient industrial administration of a coal and iron area. The desire for cultural autonomy, which has been so troublesome in the past, can be better satisfied in a federation than with independent nations on a military basis. For example, Alsace might then develop in its own way without being suppressed by either France or Germany.

The central government would maintain the army (for defense and not as a police force) and a navy. It would carry on foreign relations though national diplomacy would continue. It would have power to tax individuals, protect minorities, and hold a plebiscite in any region on the question whether it should become partly or wholly autonomous.

Sub-federations would be possible, for instance in Scandinavia or the Balkans. This would be like the New England Conference of Governors. Indeed, European federation may, Bingham thinks, be preceded by several attempts at partial federation, already illustrated by the close association of England and France during the first months of the war.

Colonies outside Europe seriously complicate any plans for European federation. It is too simple to throw them all into a single melting pot. You could not include the Dominions, India, or Algeria. However, colonies are less important than the "have not" countries think. Instead of pooling or redistributing non-self-governing colonies, Bingham would give the Union considerable power over colonial administration. The greatest need is that the resources of a colony should benefit its inhabitants. He compares a colony to the zinc and lead region in the Ozarks, which enriches outside investors and leaves the natives poor and unhealthy. International agencies should be set up to regulate investments and the conservation of scarce resources; and this should be done for the benefit of the inhabitants, consumers all over the world, workers, investors, governments, and future generations. The mandate principle is sound when really applied, but he thinks the European Union would carry out this principle better than the League.

The United States of Europe would exist within the League of Nations. There might also be other international organizations like the Pan-American Union, the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, an association of Far Eastern nations, and perhaps one of the desert peoples of North Africa and the Near East. These regional unions in Europe and elsewhere may prove only a brief interlude before world federation.

In conclusion, Bingham warns us that perfection is not just around the corner any more than prosperity. Our own Constitution succeeded only through compromises, political deals, and the accidents of personality.

A somewhat different plan for European Federation is proposed by Arnold Brecht, a professor at the New School for Social Research, in a stimulating article in the *Harvard Law Review* for February, 1942.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Brecht, being a German, escapes from the usual analogy of our Constitution. Instead, he derives several interesting suggestions from the German Confederation of 1815-1866, which, as he observes, worked better than the League of Nations. "It soon resulted in sweeping elimina-

tions of tariff barriers and it succeeded in preserving peace for about fifty years. Its end was not anarchy, but a more perfect union, plus an alliance." This article suggests the reflection that we need a cooperative endeavor to frame a plan for international organization. In a group of experienced men from different nations, each would be able to contribute fruitful ideas from his own governmental system. The resulting combination would be more likely to win acceptance from many countries than would a plan shaped largely by the political institutions of the United States or any other single nation.

#### IV

The last book to be considered at length is very hostile to the views of the other three books. It is "Federal Illusion?" by D. M. Pritt, a prominent English barrister and a Labor member of Parliament. This was published in 1940, apparently before the fall of France. It advocates a Socialist Union like that in Russia.

The chief position taken here is that war cannot be ended by proposals which leave our main economic structure untouched. The causes of war are economic, as socialists said long ago, and only socialism will insure peace. War is due to the effort to get into closed markets and obtain new fields for investment and new sources for raw materials. However, war is impossible between socialist states. They cannot quarrel over exports. There are no private interests, and the socialist system of producing what the people need and enabling them to buy it eliminates the whole element of scarcity of markets. Your country is your own market. You produce all you can consume, and consume all you produce. Nobody fights over water when there is no drought. International trade in a commodity then becomes just a question of convenience; it does not make the rich profit or the poor starve. There is no quarrel over the exploitation of colonial races, when there are no colonies, no exploitations, no private capital.

Because war is inherent in the nature of modern industrial states and the men who hold power in these, all previous schemes for peace have failed. Arbitration, formerly regarded as a panacea, does not affect the deeply-rooted conflicts of interest between rival states. The League of Nations failed because it was always designed to be an instrument for securing the protection of the imperialist and economic system of the major powers. If these interests prevented the League from fulfilling its limited functions, they would a fortiori prevent

any wider federal union from operating under the present economic system. So Pritt's argument runs.

The requisites of a successful federation are then analyzed with considerable shrewdness. Not every group of states will be willing or able to federate effectively or even ineffectively. Dicey laid down two conditions for federation: (1) A body of countries like the Swiss cantons, the American colonies or the Canadian provinces so closely connected by locality, history, race, or the like, as to be capable of bearing an impress of common nationality in the eyes of their inhabitants. (2) The existence of a very peculiar state of sentiment among the inhabitants of the member countries—a desire for union and not for unity. There is no basis for federalism if there is no desire to unite. For example, the scheme in Cromwell's time for uniting England and the Netherlands was one of those dreams which may haunt the imagination of politicians but can never be transformed into facts. On the other hand, a desire for union will lead to a single nation rather than federalism. Dicey adds that the distribution of the different powers of government between the central body and the member states, which federalism necessitates, requires courts to possess authority to act as interpreters of the Constitution. Federalism substitutes litigation for legislation. Hence it can flourish only among communities imbued with the legal spirit and a reverence for law. Furthermore, each federation has grown up under historical conditions peculiar to itself and its own reasons for existence. The United States grew out of common aims in a revolutionary war and a rising capitalist economy which demanded for its proper functioning a national market. There was no probability that competitors would amicably federate with it. Even the extension of American sway over our present area was not idyllic, for the Indians were exterminated, new territories were acquired by war with Mexico, and a great Civil War occurred.

The federal union advocated by Streit and others fails in Pritt's opinion to satisfy the requirements laid down by Dicey. The great powers have no real desire to surrender any part of their sovereignty in the political, financial or industrial field. They want to hold on to every fragment of power they possess. Even if disputes were settled by the executive or the legislature, it would be hard to get acceptance. There is even less chance that the decisions of courts would be accepted, and such acceptance is essential in federalism.

There is no force to the argument that tariffs and other barriers to commerce can be abolished by the establishment of a federal state. They are really weapons of the economic warfare between the ruling groups in a modern industrial state. The powerful interests which depend on these restrictions for their prosperity, for example, in the United States, will not consent at the behest of the federal state to lay their industry bare to foreign competition. Differences in labor costs alone show the impossibility of this. Pritt reminds us of the difficulties caused by the color bars at Versailles, although it is not quite clear just why he blames this on the rich.

The plan for the federal legislature rests, Pritt thinks, on two false assumptions: (1) That elections can be taken at their face value without investigating the conditions under which they are carried on. It is notorious that many ostensibly democratic elections are fictitious and dishonest. Wealth controls. The results would be even more warped in dictatorships and undeveloped countries. The ruling interests of different nations would merely carry their fatal rivalries into the new legislature. (2) It is assumed that all states in the federation are equal. This completely ignores the distinction between great powers, small powers, and client states under the influence of the great powers.

Then comes a sharp thrust. Streit's proposed Union is not really a world union, but limited to fifteen states. It is the preliminary syndicate and not the operating company. Many states are still left outside to fight. It excludes China, the East Indies, and Russia, which make up half the human race. Indeed, if we disregard small states and client states, the so-called world union comprises only Great Britain, the United States, and France. It is just like the proposed abortive alliance of 1918 and merely revives the Versailles grouping in place of the Four-Power Pact at Munich. The omission of Russia is extraordinary because it is the biggest example of a federated union, the most modern and the most thorough-going. Yet its constitution is wholly ignored as a model. It is more democratic than France where women cannot vote, or South Africa where the majority of adults cannot vote, or the United States where Negroes have been practically disqualified. It treats the Jews better than do other countries. Russia is a democracy where people manage affairs in industry as well as in strict politics. So Pritt reprints the Soviet Constitution

in his book as an illustrative substitute for Streit's revamped American constitution.

Russia proves that a federation of socialist republics is easy, whereas a federation of capitalist countries would at most amount to a Holy Alliance of a few powers and their satellite states. Some republics came into the Russian federation on their own initiative, but the capitalist states within the former Russian area showed no disposition to enter and would not have been welcomed. A socialist country is unified while a capitalist country is split into hostile sections. Colonial problems are not met by Streit's union, for it omits India and puts other dependencies under control. So likewise, the United States of Europe is bound to turn into a joint plan for the plunder of the colonies. But in a socialist federation colonies become people with equal rights.

If the Union be made broad enough to include Russia and other omitted countries, states which are so different cannot achieve Dicey's requisite of a feeling in favor of uniting, either for sentiment or for industrial and commercial interests. It would be impossible to federate effectively without eliminating conflicts between wealthy groups, and only socialism permits this. Consider the difficulties of an attempt to allocate markets for cotton goods between manufacturers in Great Britain and Japan. The old conflicts of interest will remain in the member nations which are not socialistic, such as restricting production to keep up prices, oil and wheat, desire for expansion, unemployment, wealth, and poverty. Union is a smoke-screen for the reactionary war aims of British and French ruling classes.

It is true that a real federation greatly reduces the danger of war. This is not because the states are federated, but because the very connections between them which led them to federate also reduce quarrels and frictions to small proportions. Federation and friendship are not cause and effect, but effects of the same causes. The attempted federation of groups of states with no real inclination toward union contains no genuine peace-making qualities. It will solve none of the real problems.

However, socialism removes the real causes of war. Countries which have abolished capitalism then have a strong common interest and a freedom from conflicts which facilitate union, as in Russia. The U.S.S.R., Pritt concludes, must be our model.

This completes my survey of four post-war schemes. One more book is worth mentioning, al-

though it proposes no scheme. This is a pamphlet issued by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, entitled "Preliminary Report and Monographs of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace." It appears as International Conciliation No. 369, for April, 1941. This is written by many different experts. Each gives a brief but meaty account of some difficult problem of international organization. I have found this the most helpful of all the books I have consulted.

### *Conclusions*

A few remarks of my own may be ventured about these four schemes. I find it easiest to start with Mr. Pritt and work backwards.

The plan for a Union open only to socialist states seems to me the least promising of all the schemes. To begin with, the U.S.S.R. is the only nation now able to pass the admissions-test, so that great internal changes must take place in Great Britain, Canada, the United States, China, France, and several other countries before the new world federation can be formed. Even a European federation must be put off until the same drastic process has taken place on a smaller scale. All this offers a gloomy prospect for peace during our lives or our children's lives. The establishment of socialism in Russia was accompanied by a long civil war and followed by a good deal more bloodshed for political and economic reasons. If, as Mr. Pritt contends, there are no conflicting interests inside a socialist state, this harmony may not be due to the inherent capacity of such a régime to produce a persuasive unification of human desires, but merely to the elimination of everybody who ventures to disagree with the people in power. Similar civil wars and purges may very well occur in the United States and the countries of western Europe before they are fit to form an international socialist Union. As I am one of those who would doubtless be liquidated, it takes more self-sacrifice than I possess to view with equanimity this cheerful sequel to World War II. Even if dissentients are allowed to emigrate or slip away, they will have to live somewhere, and they will tend to increase opposition to the federation wherever they go. When the longed-for second Armistice has at last arrived, will there be no practicable road to world peace except through a long series of violent revolutions, mass exiles, and massacres?

Of course, it is possible that the present war will produce such extensive expropriation of private property that every state will be virtually socialistic when it ends. Then the nations may be able



to slide into a socialist Union without any preliminary turmoil. Even so, it is rash to assume that socialism will automatically end war. Mr. Pritt argues that the inhabitants of a socialist state will not be aggressive because their government will produce all they need. This seems inconsistent with the occurrence of several great famines in Russia. Political and economic equality will not produce world-wide geographic equality. Even without rich men, there will be rich lands. The inhabitants of a fertile region may decline to stint themselves drastically in order to feed a famine-stricken state, and so the underfed people may surge outward into the golden wheatfields and green pastures of neighboring states.

"The mountain sheep are sweeter,  
But the valley sheep are fatter;  
We therefore deemed it meet  
To carry off the latter."

Even if your government gives you all you want now, this does not prevent you from wanting still more and perhaps persuading your government to find it beyond the frontiers. The disappearance of capitalism will remove some of the present causes of war, but others will still remain. In the present combat between Germany and Russia, both sides call themselves socialists, and certainly there is very little opportunity for private profits in either country. Future wars may result from conflicts of interest between different races or regions, between rice-eaters and meat-eaters, between clever people and plodders.

In order to adjust such conflicts peaceably, we shall need a more complex scheme than the constitution of the U.S.S.R. In spite of Mr. Pritt's praise, this does not offer a close parallel to a federation of Europe or the world. One of its member-states, Russia, contains three quarters of the area of the U.S.S.R. and two-thirds of the population. Under such conditions, one partner is likely to be predominant and the rest satellites. Even if such a system has worked satisfactorily within the Soviet Union, this tells us very little about the probable success of a greatly expanded socialist federation with several approximately equal large members. So if we proposed to set up an organization including, say, Great Britain, the Dominions, the United States, Germany, the U.S.S.R., China, and Japan, then even though they have all become socialistic states, still we shall have to draw on schemes like those of Lord Davies, Streit, and Bingham, in order to determine the best form of organization.

Our next question is, should the world unite in

some way or other, or only Europe? It is significant that Mr. Pritt's telling objections to a proposal of federalism for the world are much weakened when applied to Europe. Here is a body of countries which have belonged for centuries to an intellectual and spiritual confederation, which form an economic unit, whose boundaries have lately become less important. There is sufficient likeness and pressure in this crisis to foster a desire for union, sufficient divergence in language and traditions to make them stop short of complete unity. A respect for law is strong in western Europe at least, and even the Balkans are probably not more lawless than our frontier states a century ago.

On the other hand, a union of Europe alone presents serious perplexities. Great Britain seems an essential member, but what are you going to do with the British Empire? If you bring in Russia, half of Asia comes in too, but her omission leaves her a potential disputer with definite interests in the Baltic and the Balkans. Non-European dependencies ought to be run by a world organization, not just European, if they are to be administered for their natives and their raw materials handled for the benefit of consumers everywhere.

In short, a European union seems feasible, and it will be desirable if it be subsidiary to some sort of world organization.

Finally, League or Union? Here I feel still more cautious, but I shall throw out a few ideas for what they are worth. I began my reading with a strong feeling that the League had hopelessly failed, and that Grenville Clark's plan of Union, which I already knew, was a better way out. The more I have read, the more I have found myself swinging toward something based on the League. With all its timidities (which Congress can often imitate) and its defects, the record of unspectacular achievement is much more impressive than I realized. The so-called technical services, in particular—health, labor, etc.—must not be abandoned. Perhaps they could be merely transferred to Mr. Streit's Union, but there is more to it than that.

In the first place, it is not fair to balance against a League with bad failures a Union with no failures. The Union never existed. We do not know what it would do. My guess is that Mr. Streit's Congress might have hesitated about sanctions against Italy in 1935 as much as the Council did, and applied them no better if it lacked an international police. I also surmise that the elected

representatives from Italy or Germany in a Congress would have been *alter egos* of Mussolini and Hitler as much as their appointed delegates to Council or Assembly. A dictator can control elections easily, at least if there is no effective federal supervision, and would that have been likely?

Next, the League is a going concern, or at worst was such until Munich. You have something to start from. You know its weak points so as to remedy them. Its strong points have been operating for two decades. At least, we should be rather slow to junk it for something entirely new.

The parallel with our own Confederation and Union is tempting, but is it sound? American conditions were far more favorable to Union than are world conditions. Large areas lie outside a common tradition, and others have not developed a respect for law as we know it. A looser form of association may be appropriate, at least for some decades.

The failures of the League are not necessarily due to its structure. Causes hampered it which may not be repeated. There was its entanglement with a dictated peace—this time we may negotiate, especially if the dictators are previously replaced by democratic governments. The strains in the early years were terrific. Would the United States have survived if the Dred Scott case, secession, the recent depression, and several state dictators like Huey Long had all come within two decades after 1789? The League had to go through all that. Our Union had sixty years to become rooted before the first great strain of 1850. Finally, the League may not have worked because its members did not want very much to make it work. Rapard in his "Quest of Peace" (March 1, 1940) writes:

"The nations which had been at war with each other . . . had never concluded a real peace in that they had never succeeded in regaining each other's confidence. . . . Those who . . . had won the World War and settled the terms of peace were unwilling to prolong those efforts and to exert their influence to insure the maintenance of those terms. . . . The present plight of Europe is due less to the excessive ambitions of the men of 1919 than to the excessive debility of their successors."

It seems possible then that we shall be wise to begin with what we have, the League of Nations. It will be wise to use its experience of twenty years with legislative sessions, executive sessions, a judicial tribunal, and numerous administrative bodies of high quality. Knowing what were the mistakes of the League, we have some ideas what to avoid. This may require drastic changes in

the Covenant, and very likely some of these changes may approximate ideas suggested by Streit's Union and other schemes. For example, the League finances would be on a sounder basis if the contributions from member states were supplemented by some kind of League tax. This might conceivably be levied on all international movements of goods, money, and persons.

Getting away from details to a broad outlook on the problem of post-war international organization, the previous discussion suggests two points for the future.

In the first place, it is very important to avoid strains during the early years of the new international body. Whatever our impulses, there will be no time for vengeance. The world after the armistice will resemble a town which has to rebuild itself after a flood. The incompetents must be removed, but any other sort of punishment will be a luxury which we cannot afford. There will be too much else to do. The lesson of our own Reconstruction Period and Europe since November 11, 1918, is, then when a war is over, it ought to be over. Briand's words "Pour nous, c'est fini." ought to be spoken on the day of the armistice and not eight years afterwards. What I mean can best be illustrated by a letter from an English girl who has lived for two years in constant danger from air-raids. It was written on December 14, 1941:

"Last night I heard on the wireless an excellent 'American Commentary' by Raymond Gram Swing, which traced the course of American public opinion during this first week. He described the U. S. as a nation at first staggered with rage and shame, but quickly recovering and now steadily determined. But there is, I think, yet another quality of mind in addition to courage and resolution and self-sacrifice that is even harder to acquire and maintain, but which is essential if the war and the peace are to be won. This is a certain gentleness—the negation of spite or anger or antipathy to the German people. I don't know how to describe it. It is well shown in Aeschylus' play 'The Persians,' written to celebrate the brilliant victory of democratic Greece over the great totalitarian Persian empire. It contains no noisy self-congratulation or boasting pride, but depicts the sorrow of the relatives of the Persian dead. To be dignified in victory is very hard. How I hope that both Britain and the United States will maintain till the end of the war the quiet sanity of Athens after Salamis, the reasoned strength and belief in the future."

Another way to avoid strains is the immediate freeing of economic life after the armistice, so as to produce on both sides a feeling of great relief that the war is ended. This time there must be no food blockade.



Also, there must be no raids, like those on Vilna and Fiume. No matter what the costs, those in charge of the peace must make everybody realize that fighting has got to stop. Perhaps frictions could be reduced by establishing a temporary *status quo*, say for twenty-five years, with a definite method for later adjustments.

Strains can be reduced by the restoration of normal life through rapid reconstruction on a great scale. International understanding might be increased if this were carried out cooperatively. For example, suppose some German workmen came over to help in England and *vice versa*. Each visiting group would soon realize that people very much like themselves had suffered in a common disaster. Who will pay for this vast work of reconstruction? The answer is simple, though perhaps unpalatable. Who pays for the war? For the most part, we do. I suspect that we must also bear a heavy share of the expense of reconstruction in order to avoid an infinitely greater outlay in preparation against a Third World War.

Secondly, no scheme is enough. The spirit is even more essential. Years ago André Siegfried remarked to me that the League of Nations lacked "Geist." It had no personality. To the ordinary man it was just a distant piece of machinery in Geneva. One strong reason for the success of the United States in the early years was that the nation was immediately brought before the eyes of every citizen through flags over post-offices, federal judges and officials in every state, naval vessels in harbors, and the government stamp on coins. In some such way, the new international body must become a reality for the common man everywhere. It would be very helpful if the League could fly its flag widely and take over a considerable number of everyday things like postage stamps and coinage. The League symbol should be put on all the great public works built during reconstruction. Its officials and benefits should

be made generally visible. Recreation is an excellent way to make the League a drawing force. It might take over all youth hostels, which formed one of our most hopeful international organizations before the war. It might arrange international excursions at public expense, taking a leaf from the book of the Nazis and using these excursions for mutual understanding instead of nationalistic pride.

The spirit is all important. The new international organization requires a desire to make it work as well as a desire to start it. In this respect practically all the books I have read are at fault. They possess little emotional appeal. They lack the quality which shone so clearly in the speeches of Woodrow Wilson. We must make people everywhere want to join a world organization.

Some such organization must come into existence, for the alternative of perpetual defense and repeated total warfare is hideous. Still we must not minimize the difficulties. When the local contractor in the little Maine village where we go for the summer engages workmen from the next village, there is an outcry against the employment of "foreigners." This illustrates the frictions which must be overcome between inhabitants of different countries and different parts of the world. There is no simple solution. We must be patient and remember that cathedrals are rarely built by a single generation. We must know much—we must hope much.

<sup>1</sup> Matthew Arnold, introduction to *Poems of Wordsworth* (Golden Treasury edition) vii (1879).

<sup>2</sup> This account of China is based on Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, 339-406, 419-425, 444-447 (1940).

<sup>3</sup> Joint Resolution of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 885.

<sup>4</sup> See Carl Becker, "Making Democracy Safe in the World," 31 *Yale Review* 433 (1942).

<sup>5</sup> 55 *Harv. L. Rev.* 561.



